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In this dissertation, I explore how managerial discretion varies under different 
organizational forms, that is, the formal structures by which the behavior of members of 
firms is coordinated and controlled. In the first study, I examine the effect of ownership 
type (for-profit, government, and not-for-profit) on managerial discretion. I argue that 
organizational goals that differ across ownership types affect organizational constraints, 
which, in turn, determine the level of managerial discretion. Specifically, I hypothesize 
that the level of managerial discretion will be highest in for-profit, lowest in government, 
and lie somewhere in between in not-for-profit, organizations. The first study involves 
both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The study context is the US hospital industry, 
in which large medical malpractice lawsuits trigger changes in behavior among doctors 
who want their choices better defended in court. I study the effect of ownership type by 




ownership types. In the second study, I examine differences in levels of managerial 
discretion in the firm relative to the market. This study examines physician discretion in 
the context of the US hospital industry, specifically in terms of the effect of physician-
hospital integration on physician discretion. The research design is a multiple-case, 
inductive study involving two types of physician-hospital arrangements: an employed 
model and private practice. This research design enables me to investigate how physician 
discretion varies across hospital boundaries and understand what organizational costs are 






1.1. Theoretical Motivation 
Prior research in agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), organizational 
economics (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), and managerial capitalism (Marris, 1964) has 
emphasized the negative aspect of giving individual managers discretion. According to 
these research streams, managers, being assumed to maximize self-utility, are more likely 
to take actions that deviate from the interests of other stakeholders when they exert 
greater control over a firm. Authors within these streams of research, tending to believe 
that high levels of discretion encourage managers to appropriate wealth from other 
stakeholders and thereby impair firm performance, argue that firms should limit 
managerial discretion (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Scholars who tend to view managerial discretion in a negative light emphasize 
control of managerial discretion in the design of optimal organizational forms, that is, the 
formal structures by which firms coordinate and control the behavior of their members 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983a; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Klein, 
Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985). These scholars argue that firms should 
choose an organizational form that can deliver the desired product at the lowest cost, 
taking into account the cost of managers’ pursuit of personal interests inconsistent with 




ownership structures that reduce the costs of owners’ and managers’ conflicting interests 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983a; Fama & Jensen, 1983b). Transaction cost economics, taking 
account of the degree of vertical integration, holds that firms bring transactions within 
their boundaries to reduce transaction costs that arise from opportunistic behavior on the 
part of the transacting parties in the market (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1981).  
These theoretical arguments regarding managerial discretion emphasize value 
appropriation over value creation. Because self-interested managers with freedom to 
pursue personal interests are expected to influence the division of surplus by increasing 
their own remuneration and perks at the expense of the profits of other stakeholders, an 
increase in managers’ share is perceived as a corresponding decrease in the share 
distributed to other stakeholders. Hence, the conflict between managers and other 
stakeholders is seen as a problem of dividing the surplus. Reflecting this rationale, these 
research streams have explored managers’ appropriation of the wealth of other 
stakeholders, the consequences thereof, and conditions that restrict managers’ freedom to 
pursue personal interests.  
Relative disregard of the possibility that managerial discretion facilitates value 
creation is problematic, in particular, to scholars of strategic management, a field largely 
defined by an interest in understanding strategies for value creation and explaining 
differences in firm performance (Barney, 1991; Nelson, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Porter, 
1980). A number of scholars have posited that managers play a key role in allocating 
resources and internal capabilities (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) 
that are key to achieving superior firm performance (Peteraf, 1993). Thus, firms that 




discretion in order to reduce managers’ appropriation of the wealth of other stakeholders 
may well be forgoing opportunities to increase the size of the surplus. In other words, to 
the extent that severe constraints limit managers’ latitude to generate and pursue unique 
strategic actions, efforts to reduce managerial discretion may be counter-productive from 
the perspective of strategic management. 
The possibility that managerial discretion may facilitate value creation warrants 
revisiting previous studies’ emphasis on the negative aspect of managerial discretion. 
Prior studies have emphasized as a way to reduce managers’ freedom to pursue personal 
interests the mechanism of aligning incentives between managers and stakeholders 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Berle & Means, 1932; Hill, 1967; Williamson, 1983). 
According to these theories, different firms with similar incentive alignment should have 
the same surplus size. That this is not the case is due to the fact that the range of strategic 
actions that may affect value creation can still vary with such organizational constraints 
as auditing, control systems, budget restrictions, performance reviews, and so forth. To 
help us understand it as a source of value creation, a new perspective is needed that 
defines managerial discretion in terms of the range of actions, viewed as neutral, 
available to managers (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). The wider (or narrower) the range 
of strategic actions available to managers, the more (or fewer) opportunities there are to 
improve firm performance. Eschewing the negative view and perceiving managerial 
discretion to be neutral recognizes that it may potentially affect the size of the surplus, 
thus benefiting both managers and other stakeholders.  
The next logical question, then, is what conditions afford managers more or less 




environmental (e.g., product differentiability and market growth), (2) organizational (e.g., 
strength of culture and capital intensity), and (3) managerial (e.g., aspiration level and 
commitment) antecedents determine the level of managerial discretion (Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987). That we nevertheless still do not entirely understand how different 
organizational forms affect managerial discretion is due, in part, to differences in 
interpretatations of managerial discretion, some theorists viewing it negatively (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Marris, 1964; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 1963), other 
neutrally (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). 
My dissertation focuses on two organizational forms, (1) ownership type (for-
profit, government, and not-for-profit), and (2) degree of vertical integration. I chose 
these forms over others because their respective literatures have been particularly 
emphatic about the importance of reducing managerial discretion and, concomitantly, of 
managers’ potential appropriation of a disproportionate share of the surplus. Highlighting 
its role in facilitating value creation, I analyze how managerial discretion, defined as the 
range of actions available to managers, is affected by different organizational forms. In 
the first study, I examine how different ownership types (e.g., for-profit, government, and 
not-for-profit) place limits on managerial discretion through organizational constraints. In 
the second study, I explore how managerial discretion varies within and outside firms, 
and the organizational benefits and costs that attend the process of integration.  
  
1.2. Dissertation Outline 
 The first study reported here examines the effect of ownership type on managerial 




organizational goals, either broadening or restricting the range of actions available to 
managers. Specifically, I propose that managerial discretion decreases when the number 
and ambiguity of goals increase, and vice versa. To test this proposition, I examine the 
effect on managerial discretion of three types of ownership (e.g., for-profit, government, 
and not-for-profit) that vary distinctly in number and ambiguity of goals.  
 An exogenous shock that generates changes only in managerial behavior while 
holding other things constant would enable me to attribute to organizational constraints 
inherent in each ownership type any variation in managerial behavior. The magnitude of 
change in managerial behavior could then be interpreted as the level of managerial 
discretion. This is precisely the identification mechanism I employ in this study.  
 The exogenous shock in a quantitative study is the award of large, court-mandated 
damages that arise from medical malpractice lawsuits, which are likely to trigger changes 
in physician behavior (Danzon, 1991). Specifically, I examine how the effects of 
malpractice awards differ across these three types of ownership. Since the incentive 
systems and key elements of ownership are relatively stable, any differences in physician 
behavior observed across ownership types in response to malpractice awards are likely to 
be due to the different organizational constraints each imposes.  
 I also investigate differences in organizational constraints across ownership types 
by combining a quantitative examination with a qualitative study based on in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews with physicians and hospital administrators. I reveal through 
these interviews the range of strategic means available to physicians as a function of 
constraints like performance feedback, standardized protocols, and financial constraints. 




government, for-profit, and not-for-profit hospitals might be expected to behave 
differently. 
 In the second study undertaken for my dissertation, I examine how levels of 
discretion vary between the market and firm, and how internalizing transactions from the 
market incurs organizational costs to the firm. A dominant view in transaction cost 
economics (TCE) holds that firms internalize production to limit managers’ opportunistic 
behavior, and thereby reduce the transaction cost of market exchanges (Williamson, 1975; 
Williamson, 1981). But this central thesis of TCE neglects other changes in managerial 
behavior that might be induced by shifting transactions from market to firm. I investigate 
these unexplored, albeit important, changes in managerial behavior by means of 
organizational tools (e.g., rewards, authority, identification, and coordination) used to 
reduce opportunistic behavior and coordinate transactions within a firm. Use of such 
tools, however, may occasion other changes in managerial behavior that can incur costs 
(e.g., social attachment costs, inefficiency in communication, and influence costs) as well 
as yield benefits (e.g., shared identity and enhanced coordination) not associated with 
market exchange. Nor is it clear how managerial discretion changes consequent to 
internalizing production. Deploying these organizational tools may foster managerial 
actions to positively influence value creation or distort managerial behavior (Baker, 2002) 
in ways that negatively affect organizational outcomes. To summarize, our understanding 
of the consequences, in terms of organizational costs and changes in managerial 
discretion, of moving transactions from the market to the firm is limited. 
 The empirical study, like the former study, examines physician discretion in the 




hospital integration on physician discretion. The research design I employ is a multiple-
case study involving two types of physician-hospital arrangements: (1) an employed 
model (i.e., an integrated salary model whereby a group of physicians is salaried by a 
hospital system to provide medical services), and (2) a private practice (i.e., a contractual 
arrangement between physician practices and a hospital; a physician or group of 
physicians who practice medicine independently, not as an employee or employees of a 
hospital). Although there are other types of physician-hospital arrangements (e.g., equity 
model, foundation, and management service organization), I choose these two 
arrangements with an eye to examining the distinct effect of physician-hospital 
integration on physician behavior. This research design enables me to investigate how 
physician behavior varies across hospital boundaries and ultimately understand the 
unique organizational costs imposed by integration. 
 
1.3. Contributions 
 This dissertation will contribute to the field of strategy, emphasizing, in particular, 
the role of managerial discretion. I propose an alteration to the theoretical framework that 
adjusts the view of managerial discretion from something negative to something that, 
carefully designed, can enhance organizational outcomes. Assuming that managers’ 
latitude is exercised only to appropriate firm profits may foster excessive restrictiveness 
that limits the range of strategic actions that may have the potential to increase firms’ 
surplus. I argue here that managers’ latitude can be exercised as well to generate 




internalization of production affect managerial discretion, posit organizational form as a 
key determinant of organizational outcomes. 
 The theoretical framework for my dissertation also emphasizes that owing to their 
interdependence, it is naïve to assume that other elements can be held constant when 
firms attempt to change a particular element (e.g., reduce managers’ opportunistic 
behavior). Altering the function of one element might have a negative impact on the 
functions of other elements. For example, in a firm, authority might coordinate 
transactions better than the market by deterring bargaining and hold-ups, but 
concomitantly generate influence costs and weaken productive activities (Milgrom, 1988; 
Milgrom & Roberts, 1988). Absent consideration of this interdependence, benefits that 
accrue to enhancements to one element might be outweighed by costs attendant on 
unanticipated changes in other elements. In acknowledging the critical role of 
interdependence in designing optimal organizational forms, my dissertation departs from 





2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The Concept of Managerial Discretion 
Many theorists and researchers have recently paid attention to the role of 
managerial discretion in explaining organizational outcomes. With the growing 
recognition of managers’ influence on organizational outcomes (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; 
Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972; Weiner & Mahoney, 1981), managerial discretion, albeit 
with different assumptions and implications, has become an area of interest to scholars of 
economics and organization theory. 
Prior to agency theory and upper echelon theory, however, managers and their 
discretion had been little acknowledged in theorizing about organizational outcomes. 
Neoclassical economics treats the roles neither of firm nor manager, considering the 
former merely a production unit that converts inputs to outputs according to market 
conditions. Being focused on price equilibrium and optimal allocation of resources, 
neoclassical economics views the firm and its managers as a black box.  
Similarly, theories of industrial organization view the firm as merely a component 
of industry structure. Industrial organization studies how organizing mechanisms like the 
free market harmonize productive activities with demand for goods and services, and 
how variations and imperfections in these mechanisms affect the satisfaction of economic 




Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm (Bain, 1951; Mason, 1949), for instance, the 
structure of relevant markets or industries affects firm conduct, which, in turn, determines 
performance. This paradigm assumes individual firms to be passive, that is, to make no 
effort to change industry structure, which is deemed exogenous to firm conduct and 
performance. SCP also admits little or no role for managers in organizational conduct.  
There eventually emerged organizational theories (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) that considered the effect of 
managers on organizational conduct and outcomes, but did not go so far as to assert that 
managers ultimately matter. Inertia in ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), external 
dependence in resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and isomorphism 
in neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) afford little room for managers to 
influence organizational outcomes.  
In contrast to these theories, which either overlook the role of managers or 
emphasize the constraints faced by individuals, later theories (e.g., agency theory, 
managerial capitalism, organizational economics, and upper echelon theory) 
acknowledged roles for management as well as for individual managers. This 
acknowledgement reflects findings that a significant proportion of variance in firm 
performance is attributable to managers, independent of industry, strategic group, and 
year (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972; Weiner & Mahoney, 1981). 
In this chapter, I review two streams of research that address managerial discretion in 





2.1.1. Managerial Discretion in Economics 
Managerial discretion is viewed negatively by research in organizational 
economics (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and 
managerial capitalism (Marris, 1964). 1  Organizational economics views managerial 
discretion as engaging in personal pursuits (“outside activities”) during business hours 
(Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).2 Agency theory maintains 
that self-interested, opportunistic managers given a high level of discretion will 
appropriate firm profits (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 
1963)3
In all three of these contexts, managerial discretion begets opportunistic behavior, 
negatively influences corporate profits, and thereby impairs owners’ interests of owners, 
both short- and long-term (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). In the short term, managers 
waste firm resources by increasing their non-salary income or consuming perquisites 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1963). Long-term, managers choose strategies 
 and that managers’ pursuit of personal objectives like salary, security, power, 
status, prestige, and professional excellence deprives firms of productivity gains 
(Williamson, 1963). Managerial capitalism holds that managers pursue growth over profit 
maximization because increases in salary, power, and status commensurate with increases 
in firm size enhance managers’ utility function (Marris, 1964; Misangyi, 2002). 
                                                 
1 The problem of conflicting interest between stakeholders and management is salient when there 
is separation of ownership and control, and more severe when the ownership is dispersed among atomistic 
shareholders.  
2 “… [Employees] use that freedom in part to pursue personally beneficial activities. (p.38) It is 
optimal to give the agent more freedom to pursue personal business when he is financially more 
responsible for his performance” (p. 41) (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) 
3 “…Control of agency problems in the decision process is important when the decision managers 
who initiate and implement important decisions are not the major residual claimants… Without effective 
control procedures, such decision managers are more likely to take actions that deviate from the interests of 




according to personal desires regarding firm size or growth over profits. Managers who 
enjoy high levels of discretion have been shown, for example, to be more likely to adopt 
acquisition strategies, which would ultimately increase their compensation (Wright, Kroll, 
& Elenkov, 2002). Similarly, scholars describing the concept of “agency cost of 
managerial discretion” have shown managers with a high degree of discretion to be less 
likely to take recourse to debt in capital structure choices because they cannot pursue 
their personal interests at shareholder expense when free cash flow is used to pay interest 
(Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997; Jung, Kim, & Stulz, 1996; Stulz, 1990). 
 
2.1.2. Managerial Discretion in Upper Echelon Theory 
Managerial discretion has not entirely been disregarded or viewed in a negative 
light. Upper echelon theory, viewing managerial discretion as the range of strategic 
means available to managers for pursuing goals set by stakeholders, codes it neutrally 
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).4
The literature in upper echelon theory that posits managerial discretion to be the 
available range of strategic actions has developed such that scholars have identified 
conditions that enhance and inhibit managerial action. In other words, managerial 
 Absent particular assumptions about human behavior, 
upper echelon theory scholars maintain opportunities for their skills and leadership to be 
reflected in organizational outcomes are greater for managers with high than for mangers 
with low levels of discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).  
                                                 
4 “… Here, discretion will be defined as latitude of managerial action (p.371)… It is useful to 
comment on the requirement that discretion involve potential actions rather than merely ‘choices’ or 





discretion has been established as a moderator of the association between executive 
characteristics and organizational outcomes. The extensive opportunities for managers 
suggest a much stronger association between managers and organizational outcomes in 
the high-discretion than in the low-discretion case. Section 2.2 covers empirical studies 
on the determinants of managerial discretion.  
 
2.1.3. Summary and Critique  
To summarize, managerial discretion is viewed negatively by the literature on 
economics, which emphasizes the potential for managers to pursue personal objectives 
over goals set by stakeholders, and as a value-neutral proposition by literature on upper 
echelon theory, which acknowledges the potential for organizational outcomes to be 
affected positively as well as negatively. 
The economic literature’s emphasis on the negative aspect of managerial 
discretion can be problematic for two reasons. First, many scholars have found that 
individual managers are key source of firm performance heterogeneity (Bertrand & 
Schoar, 2003; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). This implies that having strict constraints to 
reduce negative managerial discretion may overly limit managers’ latitude to generate 
firm performance differentially. Further, those who view discretion negatively and 
propose reducing it only by means of the instrument of aligning incentives may fail to 
appreciate that the true range of actions available to managers is determined by a host of 
constraints (e.g., auditing, control systems, budget restrictions, and performance reviews) 
beyond incentive alignment. That discretion can still differ under the same incentive 




is achieved through stock options that increase managers’ financial benefit when the 
company's stock rises: managers in organizations with loose monitoring systems may be 
better able to expand the array of options for maximizing profitability than managers in 
organizations with strict monitoring systems, in which new strategies and products are 
not easily accommodated without approval. That managers subject to essentially the same 
level of incentive alignment will enjoy a higher level of discretion in organizations with 
loose than in organizations with strict monitoring is evidence that focusing only on the 
instrument of incentive alignment may limit our understanding of managerial discretion.  
 Therefore, in my dissertation, I take the neutral view in order to explore the 
important role of managerial discretion in facilitating value creation and identify the true 
determinants of discretion level, leaving the performance implications of discretion for 
future research. The present research makes a distinction between firms with high and 
low discretion, absent which it is difficult to discuss the effect of managerial discretion 
on performance. Identifying the underlying mechanism that determines discretion level 
will broaden our understanding of its performance implications. In the next section, I 
review the previous literature on the determinants of managerial discretion.  
 
2.2. Studies of Managerial Discretion as Latitude in Actions 
2.2.1. Determinants and Measurement of Managerial Discretion 
The concept of managerial discretion in actions introduced by Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1987) theorizes it to be a function of (1) the task environment (e.g., product 
differentiability, market growth, industry structure, demand instability, quasi-legal 




size, age, strength of culture, capital intensity, and resource availability), and (3) 
managerial characteristics (e.g., aspiration level, commitment, and cognitive complexity).  
Research aimed at operationalizing the concept of managerial discretion has been 
preoccupied with industry level conditions, the measure most commonly explored being 
variation across industries (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990).5
                                                 
5  Some scholars, however, examined the effect of macro-environmental factors (such as the 
national setting) affect managerial discretion (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007) 
 Finkelstein and Hambrick’s 
(1990) examination of whether the relationship between top management team (TMT) 
tenure and organizational outcome is moderated by managerial discretion, for example, 
used industry as a measure of managerial discretion. Grouping industries according to 
degree of managerial discretion—computer industry, high discretion; chemical industry, 
moderate discretion; natural gas industry, low discretion—they found the association 
between TMT tenure and performance to be greater in the computer industry than in the 
natural gas industry. Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson (1993) again relating 
different industries to different discretion levels (food and beverage, computing 
equipment, and scientific and measuring equipment industries to high discretion; public 
utility, natural resource, and telecommunications service industries to low discretion), 
found the relationship between performance and commitment to the status quo to be 
moderated by discretion level. Similarly, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993), in their study 
of whether the relation between team size and CEO dominance to firm performance is 
stronger in high or low discretion environments, used the computer and natural gas 
industries as their indicators of high and low discretion, respectively. To better justify 




tried to establish an overall measure by asking scholars and security analysts to assess the 
level of discretion in each industry (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Hambrick & 
Abrahamson, 1995). 
In contrast to this preoccupation with industry measures as a proxy for managerial 
discretion, other studies have used firm- and individual-level variables to measure 
managerial discretion. Boyd and Salamin (2001), Rajagopalan & Finkelstein (1992), and 
Rajagopalan (1997), using firm-level variables, viewed “prospector” firms as high 
discretion and “defender” firms as low discretion. Finkelstein and Boyd (1998), 
measuring discretion using six indicators, including firm-level variables, like growth and 
capital, R&D, and advertising intensity, found that (1) the greater the level of managerial 
discretion, the greater the CEO compensation and (2) firm performance increases when 
discretion and compensation are aligned. Aragón-Correa, Matías-Reche, and Senise-
Barrio (2004), measuring managerial discretion by means of individual-level variables, 
specifically, membership in a dominant coalition, explored whether environmental 
commitment is associated with high levels of managerial discretion. Boyd & Salamin 
(2001), using position in a firm’s hierarchy (from employees to managing directors) as a 
proxy for managerial discretion, showed that discretion has both main and interactive 
effects on corporate pay systems. Lastly, Carpenter & Golden (1997) used questionnaires 






2.2.2. Summary and Critique  
The latter studies of managerial discretion (latitude in actions) notwithstanding, 
two gaps continue to be observed in existing studies. First, we still lack an understanding 
of how firm-level variables affect managerial discretion. Compared to preponderance of 
studies focused on the industry (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Datta, Guthrie, & 
Wright, 2005; Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; Datta, Rajagopalan, & Zhang, 2003; 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 
1995) and individual (Aragón-Correa, Matías-Reche, & Senise-Barrio, 2004; Boyd & 
Salamin, 2001; Carpenter & Golden, 1997) levels, relatively few studies have adopted a 
firm-level perspective. Considering that firm strategies are key determinants of firm 
performance, especially in the field of strategy, what little has been done—“strategic 
emphasis – prospectors vs. defenders (Miles & Snow, 1978)” (Boyd & Salamin, 2001; 
Rajagopalan, 1997; Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 1992) and “R&D or advertising intensity” 
(Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998)—is still insufficient.  
Second, few studies have directly measured managerial discretion. The lack of a 
direct measure is associated with the way the concept of managerial discretion first 
emerged in upper echelon theory. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) resolved the tension 
between the deterministic perspective that managers do not matter much and the strategic 
management perspective that they do by introducing the concept of managerial discretion. 
Thus, finding the conditions under which managers have a greater impact on 
organizational outcomes received more attention than did testing whether specific 
determinants increase or decrease managerial discretion. There was, for example, 




strategic persistence is stronger in the computer industry than in the natural gas industry 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990), but little interest in determining whether managers 
enjoy greater latitude with respect to strategic action in one or the other of those 
industries. Scholars simply inferred an extensive range of action from the increased 
variance explained by executive characteristics under certain conditions.  
I attempt to fill these gaps in the prior literature by focusing on how firm-level 
variables, especially organizational forms, affect managerial discretion. In the following 
chapter, I examine the effect of ownership type on managerial behavior. In the fourth 
chapter, I describe different levels of discretion in the market and in the firm. I depart 
from previous studies that merely inferred discretion from change in variance by 





3. HOW MANAGERIAL DISCRETION VARIES ACROSS OWNERSHIP TYPES 
3.1. Introduction 
With the advent of the industrial revolution and rise of firms with significant 
capital assets, questions of how best to design ownership types and how to allocate rights 
to profits among stakeholders have remained central to the study of organizations (Berle 
& Means, 1932; Hansmann, 2000; Veblen, 1924).6
The idea that an equilibrium ownership type is chosen to balance the tradeoff 
between risk bearing costs and agency costs has spawned much of the agency theory 
literature in this domain (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; Fama & Jensen, 1983a; Fama & 
 Originally, the classical theory of 
ownership views how firms choose optimal ownership types in terms of a tradeoff 
between risk bearing costs and agency costs (Demsetz, 1997; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Risk bearing costs reflect the limited ability of a concentrated set of owner-managers to 
diversify firm-specific risks, while agency costs reflect the potential for managers to 
appropriate the capital of many arm’s-length investors. By comparing these competing 
costs for each transaction, firms choose ownership types so as to minimize these 
competing costs across a range of transactions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
                                                 
6 Ownership types can variously be categorized in terms of ownership dispersion (concentrated 
and dispersed), identity of stakeholders (consumers, producers, and risk bearers), and organizational goals 




Jensen, 1983b). Agency theorists argue that risk bearing costs and agency costs vary 
linearly over the stock dispersion continuum: risk bearing costs are low under dispersed 
ownership and agency costs are low under concentrated ownership (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, agency theory maintains that 
the need to reduce risk bearing costs drives ownership towards common stock 
corporations with dispersed ownership and the need to control agency costs drives 
ownership towards sole proprietorship with concentrated ownership. The key mechanism 
for controlling agency costs is aligning managers’ interests with those of owners 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers may 
pursue personal objectives over those of the owners in the absence of disciplining 
mechanisms, while managerial behavior is argued to benefit managers and owners alike 
in the presence of incentive alignment.  
Although agency theory emphasizes the role of incentives when examining the 
impact of ownership type on managerial behavior, these incentives are but one instrument. 
There exist other organizational instruments associated with ownership types such as 
organizational constraints (e.g., auditing, control systems, budget restrictions, and 
performance reviews). Thus, managerial discretion can be viewed as spanning a 
continuum. Where a manager lies on that continuum may be, in part, a function of these 
other aspects of ownership. For example, the degree of managerial discretion will be 
lower in organizations with stringent auditing requirements and budgetary controls. In 
short, different ownership types will likely employ different kinds of constraints that 




ownership types are associated with greater or lesser agency costs than on the different 
levels of discretion that these ownership types afford.  
The first study reported in this dissertation examines the extent of managerial 
discretion under different ownership types (for-profit, government, and not-for-profit).7
If the design of incentives is assumed to be the only distinguishing feature of 
ownership type, then ownership type is expected to have no direct effect on managerial 
 I 
argue that organizational goals that differ across ownership types affect the flexibility of 
managers to pursue personal interests, and thereby the range of strategic actions available 
to them. Specifically, I argue that when organizational goals are few in number and easily 
measurable, managers have little room to pursue personal objectives. In this context, 
stakeholders impose weak organizational constraints, yielding a high level of managerial 
discretion in actions. Conversely, when organizational goals are many and less 
measurable, and when organizational outcomes cannot be accurately assessed, 
stakeholders have incentives to provide specific guidelines that constrain managers’ 
actions, yielding a low level of managerial discretion. Managerial discretion in actions 
under a particular ownership type thus spans a continuum. At one end of the continuum, 
managers enjoy full freedom to choose actions that achieve the limited and measurable 
goals defined by stakeholders. At the other end, managers are relatively constrained in 
the choice of actions that would enable them to achieve a broad range of less measurable 
goals.  
                                                 
7  Although economists view managerial discretion in terms of managers’ freedom to pursue 
personal interests, that is, in terms of goals (Shen & Cho, 2005), I focus in this paper on Hambrick and 




behavior. Consequently, Demsetz and his colleagues (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001) have argued that if ownership types and incentives 
are simultaneously chosen to induce optimal managerial behavior, regressing managerial 
behavior on ownership type will not reveal the true relationship between the two. In 
contrast to this perspective, I argue that ownership type can directly affect managerial 
behavior independent of incentives. In fact, various ownership types having different 
goals will employ different kinds of organizational constraints that affect the range of 
managerial action or managerial discretion. To empirically identify the direct relationship 
between ownership type and managerial discretion, I have selected malpractice lawsuits 
in the hospital industry as an example of an exogenous shock that changes managerial 
behavior, but does not affect incentives or ownership types. Following this shock, 
variation in managerial behavior across ownership types may be attributed to the 
organizational constraints inherent in each type of ownership. I identify the magnitude of 
change in managerial behavior as managerial discretion.  
Medical malpractice lawsuits are likely to trigger changes in physician behavior 
without immediately altering a hospital’s incentive system or the nature of ownership 
(Danzon, 1991). In light of this, I examine how changes in physician behavior following 
increases in malpractice awards (the shock) differ across ownership types. My theory is 
that because the key elements of ownership are relatively stable, differences in physician 
behavior are likely due to the different levels of discretion afforded by each type of 
ownership. Specifically, having theorized that the number and ambiguity of goals will 




increases in malpractice awards on physician behavior will be most profound in for-profit, 
the least in government, and somewhere in between in not-for-profit, hospitals. 
The contributions of my study are threefold. First, my study considers 
organizational constraints as an important new lever that guides managerial behavior, 
unlike much of the ownership literature that focuses on the lever of incentive alignment. 
Consequently, this latter approach posits that ownership type itself does not affect 
managerial behavior due to the endogeniety between ownership type and incentives. In 
contrast, my analysis affords a theoretical insight that even if ownership type and 
incentives are simultaneously chosen, ownership type can still generate different 
managerial behavior due to different organizational constraints within each ownership 
type.  
Second, my analysis contributes to the empirical rigor of the literature on 
ownership. The static approach that accounts for the endogeniety between ownership and 
incentives limits our understanding of the effect of ownership because it is hard to 
separate two mechanisms: organizational constraints and incentives. My unique empirical 
setting exposes managerial behavior, but not incentives and ownership type, to an 
external shock, allowing me to separate these two. By showing that ownership type 
shapes managerial behavior through different organizational constraints, my study 
enhances our understanding of the effect of ownership.  
Lastly, my study helps to illuminate the micro-foundations of managerial 
discretion. Several extant studies on managerial discretion have measured the conditions 




Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) assessed whether the relationship between top 
management team (TMT) tenure and strategic persistence is stronger in the computer 
industry than in the natural gas industry, and simply inferred an extensive range of action 
from the increased variance explained by executive characteristics in the computer 
industry compared to the natural gas industry. Through interviews, I examine, at a micro 
level, how different ownership types impose organizational constraints. Thus, compared 
to extant empirical studies on managerial discretion, I can show more directly whether 
managers enjoy greater latitude with respect to strategic action under one or the other 
ownership type. Performance feedback, peer pressure, financial constraints, protocols, 
and guidelines are among the organizational constraints that are key mechanisms of the 
theory which my qualitative study is designed to elucidate.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. I first discuss the relevant 
literature on managerial discretion as well as the literature on how ownership affects both 
the bargaining over a surplus and the size of the surplus. After summarizing the literature 
on ownership and managerial discretion, I develop my principal theory of how different 
ownership types affect managerial discretion. A description of the hypotheses in a 
research context, that is, the U.S. hospital industry, follows. Explanations of the 
quantitative and qualitative designs are followed by my presentation of the results, 





3.2. Prior Literature 
3.2.1. Ownership and Division of the Surplus 
Firms can fund projects with either inside owner-managers’ private monies or 
capital provided by outside creditors or investors who have no direct role in management. 
These options incur competing costs (Demsetz, 1997; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Whereas owner-managers who provide their own capital and perform all transactions 
internally incur risk bearing costs that reflect a limited capability to diversify (i.e., “too 
many eggs in one basket”), recourse to debt or equity financing entails either or both of 
two types of agency costs. Agency costs of debt reflect the propensity for choosing 
riskier projects that may benefit owner-managers more than bondholders as opposed to 
pursuing less risky projects that ensure the latter’s fixed claims (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Agency costs of equity reflect managerial behaviors like shirking and perquisite 
consumption at the expense of equity holders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). After 
comparing these competing costs for every transaction, firms choose a source of 
financing. If risk bearing costs exceed agency costs, outside funding is chosen; if agency 
costs exceed risk bearing costs, owners put forward their own capital. Throughout this 
process, firms attempt to minimize the sum of risk bearing costs and agency costs across 
the range of transactions undertaken. This cost minimization logic explains the 
assignment of ownership. 
Taken together, the tradeoff between risk bearing costs and agency costs and the 
equilibrium ownership type of the firm are theoretically explained by the classical view 
of ownership type (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, there has been little empirical 




financing) and outside (through debt or equity financing) ownership claims for each 
transaction. This is because difficulties in measuring and comparing risk bearing costs 
and agency costs have prevented scholars from exploring the most cost-efficient 
ownership type. How, for example, are lack of diversification (risk bearing cost) and 
shirking behavior (agency cost) to be measured? A further difficulty is that the problem 
of operationalizing costs is exacerbated by the multitude of a firm’s transactions, across 
which risk bearing costs and agency costs must be summed to identify the optimal 
ownership type.  
These empirical challenges have been addressed by agency theorists, in part, by 
adopting dispersion of stock ownership as a proxy for the sum of risk bearing costs and 
“agency costs” for an array of transactions (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000; Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988).8
                                                 
8  Prior studies have measured stock concentration differently (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 
1995)(p.181), for example, as concentration among all shareholders (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), percent 
ownership by the board (Morck et al., 1988), and percent ownership by the board and all officers 
(McConnell & Servaes, 1990) 
  These costs have 
been shown to vary along the continuum of stock dispersion (see Table 1), from sole 
proprietorship (i.e., concentrated ownership) to common stock (i.e., dispersed ownership). 
Under concentrated ownership, risk bearing costs are high and agency costs are low. As 
ownership becomes dispersed, risk bearing costs decline and agency costs increase. 
According to agency theory, ownership is concentrated when the diminution of agency 
costs under unified ownership and control is sufficient to offset risk bearing costs; 
however, ownership is dispersed when risk bearing costs are sufficiently low to offset the 




In short, firm-level costs, which are the sum of risk bearing costs and agency costs for an 
array of transactions, vary with the dispersion of stock ownership, and firms choose the 
most cost efficient ownership type (in agency theory, the optimal division of ownership 
between managers and owners). The study of ownership type was rendered empirically 
amenable by this approach, which allowed researchers to move beyond the analysis of 
transaction-level costs of risk bearing and agency problems to compare the overall firm-
level costs that explain the existence of particular ownership types. 
< Insert Table 1 about here >  
The key mechanism used by agency theorists to predict optimal ownership types 
is the incentive alignment between owners and managers (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These theorists assume that agents are self-
interested (Berle & Means, 1932). This self-interest is not problematic in the case of 
concentrated ownership because managers’ and owners’ interests implicitly correspond; 
owner-managers maximize their utility from both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns. 
In the absence of incentive alignment, which is the case for dispersed ownership, 
managers might engage in behavior inconsistent with the interests of owners; for example, 
they may expend firm resources on expensive office designs or lavish birthday parties. 
Actions of this sort will increase proportionally with the owners’ failure to employ 
effective incentive aligning mechanisms (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Thus, other factors held constant, the more dispersed a firm’s ownership, the 
higher its anticipated agency costs.  
However elegantly it explains optimal ownership types, agency theory typically 




Without disputing the importance of stock ownership dispersion, I emphasize here that 
ownership may encompass a much broader set of attributes and vary by, among other 
things, profit objective (e.g., not-for-profit and mutual vs. others), identity of stakeholders 
(e.g., consumers, producers, and risk bearers), organizational goals (e.g., for-profit, 
government, and not-for-profit), and governance structure (e.g., alliances, corporate 
ventures, joint ventures, and subsidiaries). Such variation may be found even among 
entities with the same level of ownership dispersion. Moreover, when the focus shifts to 
non-traditional organizational forms such as NGOs, hospitals, charities, and universities 
― entities rarely listed on the stock market ― the manner in which ownership rights are 
assigned cannot be adequately explained by agency theory. Thus, a theory broader in 
scope is required to understand the implications of alternative ownership types.  
Incentive alignment, the key mechanism for restricting managers’ freedom to 
pursue personal interests in agency theory, becomes problematic when we attempt to use 
it to examine the implications of alternative ownership types. This is because ownership 
type may incorporate organizational constraints beyond incentive alignment (e.g., tax, 
auditing, and accounting practices) that may also affect managerial behavior. Even given 
the same proportional assignment of ownership rights between managers and owners, 
auditing systems and other organizational constraints may vary significantly.  
To summarize, the focus on the incentive alignment mechanism in agency theory 
has provided a sound theoretical framework for describing the effect of ownership type, 
particularly dispersion of stock ownership, on the distribution of profits between owners 
and managers. Because self-interested managers with freedom to pursue personal 




profits of other stakeholders, an increase in managers’ share is perceived as a 
corresponding decrease in the share distributed to other stakeholders. However, when we 
consider other aspects of ownership that affect managerial behavior ― including auditing, 
monitoring, and resource allocation ― the impact of ownership type can be extended 
beyond bargaining over the surplus to the size of the surplus. For example, let’s assume 
that company A and company B have the same level of ownership dispersion, and 
company A has loose auditing and monitoring systems, while company B has strong ones. 
The relatively weak auditing and monitoring systems associated with company A may 
accommodate a broader range of managerial actions that may enhance its performance 
than the strong auditing and monitoring systems in company B. Of key importance here 
is that the relationship between ownership type and the size of the surplus is not premised 
solely on incentive alignment. Other aspects of ownership type as well may affect the 
range of managerial behaviors in ways that might lead to differences in the size of the 
surplus.   
 
3.2.2. Ownership and Size of the Surplus 
The idea that ownership type may affect the size of the surplus was first 
introduced by Veblen (1924). In explaining his theory, Veblen assumed the motives of 
owners and managers to be different: owners are interested only in restricting output or 
raising prices to obtain the highest possible profits, while professional managers are 
interested in increasing the efficiency of all economic activities. Because the separation 
of ownership and control can be regarded as a discretionary handover of power from 




monopoly seeking to efficiency seeking. Given that the efficiency profits that arise from 
dispersed ownership are sustainable under antitrust law, whereas the monopoly profits 
that arise from concentrated ownership are not, the size of the surplus is affected. Veblen 
thus maintained that the separation of ownership from control should positively affect a 
firm’s performance by changing the overall organizational goals.  
Further, according to Veblen (1924), differences in the motives of managers and 
owners reflect differences in training, experience, and preference. Managers with 
technical training or those involved in scientific management are assumed to increase 
efficiency. Owners lacking this training or scientific management experience are assumed 
to be guided by collusion and output restriction to maximize the return on their capital. 
Whether by training or preference, managers are rarely motivated to pursue monopoly 
profits and owners are incapable of effectual insights into the use of resources to improve 
efficiency.  
Independent of the underlying reason for the differing motives of managers and 
owners, Veblen’s early observation that ownership type may account for differences in 
managerial behavior that differentially affect firm performance is noteworthy. Despite 
Veblen’s perspective that ownership type affects the size of the surplus, later studies, 
including those focused on agency theory, have not developed this idea further.9
                                                 
9 Fama and Jensen are the exception in examining how different organizational forms’ (open 
corporations, financial mutuals, and non-profits vs. proprietorships, partnerships, and closed corporations) 
use of different investment rules might affect surplus size (Fama & Jensen, 1985).  
 Agency 
theory, in particular, with its focus on negative aspects of giving managerial discretion 




became preoccupied with the importance of limiting, through incentive alignment, 
managers’ freedom to pursue personal interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Subsequent 
empirical studies have consequently emphasized testing the impact of ownership type on 
bargaining over profits rather than generating them.  
This relative disregard for the possibility that ownership type may facilitate value 
creation is problematic, especially for scholars of strategic management, a field largely 
defined by an interest in understanding strategies for value creation and in explaining 
differences in firm performance (Barney, 1991; Nelson, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Porter, 
1980). Accordingly, I build on Veblen’s insight that ownership types generate differences 
in managerial behavior that affects the size of the surplus. However, I depart from this 
reasoning by assuming managers’ preferences to be constant. Although diversity in 
managers’ preferences is of interest, my goal in this study is not to establish that 
managers with different preferences can be found within each ownership type, but rather 
to demonstrate that managers with the same preferences may behave differently under 
different types of ownership. Thus, eschewing the alternative explanation that managers 
select into ownership types consistent with their preferences, I examine how 
organizational factors account for differences in managerial behavior that may further 
affect the size of the surplus. I use the concept of managerial discretion to describe 





3.2.3. Ownership and Managerial Discretion 
 As described in the second chapter, managerial discretion has been a topic of 
interest among scholars of economics and upper echelon theory, but with different 
implications for their respective disciplines. In economics, proponents of agency theory 
and transaction cost theory maintain that self-interested managers with a high level of 
discretion will appropriate firm profits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1963). In 
contrast, upper echelon theory construes managerial discretion (i.e., the range of strategic 
means available to managers for achieving goals set by stakeholders) to be neutral. 
Lacking strong assumptions about human behavior (e.g., rationality or opportunism), 
scholars in upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) argue that high levels 
of discretion afford more opportunities for managers’ skills and leadership to be reflected 
in organizational outcomes, whereas low levels of discretion limit opportunities for 
managers to influence organizational outcomes.  
  These two interpretations are particularly useful in exploring the impact of 
ownership type on managerial behavior because each emphasizes a different underlying 
mechanism in the relationship between ownership type and managerial behavior. 
Economists emphasize the mechanism of incentive alignment between managers and 
owners, while upper echelon theorists emphasize the mechanism of various 
organizational instruments (e.g., auditing, budget restrictions, and resource allocation) 
that limit the range of actions available to managers. As suggested earlier, the impact of 
ownership type is expected to differ with each mechanism. Whereas incentive alignment 




organizational instruments explain the link between ownership type and the size of the 
surplus.  
 Although the present study of the effect of alternative ownership types on 
managerial behavior, and potentially the size of the surplus, adopts the neutral view of 
managerial discretion, both mechanisms are considered. As mentioned above, incentives 
that influence managers’ pursuit of personal or stakeholder interests are not the only 
mechanism that underlies the relationship between ownership type and managerial 
behavior. Managerial discretion, which is determined by various organizational 
instruments, can be a source of value creation inasmuch as the wider (narrower) the range 
of strategic actions available to managers, the more (fewer) opportunities there are to 
improve firm performance.  
Despite the role of discretion in actions in explaining the relationship between 
ownership type and managerial behavior, scholars have paid little attention to how 
ownership affects managers’ latitude with regard to the range of actions available to them. 
Research aimed at operationalizing Hambrick and Finkelstein’s (1987) conceptualization 
of managerial discretion in actions has been preoccupied with explaining industry-level 
variation in discretion (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Datta et al., 2005; Datta & 
Rajagopalan, 1998; Datta et al., 2003; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995). These studies have found that the 
relation between executive characteristics and firm performance is stronger in high 
discretion industries than low discretion industries. Others have used firm-level variables 
(e.g., “prospector” firms as high discretion and “defender” firms as low discretion) (Boyd 




Finkelstein, 1992) and individual-level variables (e.g., membership in a dominant 
coalition and position in a firms’ hierarchy) (Aragón-Correa, Matías-Reche, & Senise-
Barrio, 2004; Boyd et al., 2001; Carpenter & Golden, 1997) to measure managerial 
discretion. Notwithstanding the extensive extant literature on determinants of managerial 
discretion, only one aspect of ownership ― the dispersion of stock ownership ― has 
been previously studied (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995). In order to fill the gap in the 
previous literature, the first study reported in my dissertation examines how the level of 
managerial discretion in actions varies across alternative ownership types (government, 
for-profit, and not-for-profit). 
 
3.3. Theory and Propositions 
Ownership types can be classified in various ways including profit objective, 
stakeholder identity, and ownership dispersion (Hansmann, 2000). My study focuses on 
ownership types, specifically, government, for-profit, and not-for-profit, that differ in 
terms of organizational goals. The main theory advanced is that ownership type 
determines the number and measurability of organizational goals and the corresponding 
level of freedom of managers to pursue personal interests. This level, in turn, influences 
organizational constraints on managerial discretion. I argue that when managers’ 
potential to pursue personal interest is high, managerial discretion will be 
correspondingly low. By the same token, I argue that when managers’ potential to pursue 
personal interests is low, managerial discretion will be high. 
When ownership type is characterized by multiple, vague goals, stakeholders, 




measurable, will compensate by imposing strong organizational constraints designed to 
monitor and limit managerial discretion. The existence of goal diversity affects 
managerial behavior because managers can pick and choose the goals. Whether managers 
can pursue personal or stakeholders’ goals is unproblematic if all goals are positively 
correlated, that is, are complements. However, if each goal embraces the same criteria for 
generating and selecting among alternative courses of actions, there is no reason to have 
multiple goals within an organization. More specifically, the presence of multiple goals 
implies either non-correlation or negative correlations (Meyer, 2002). This, in turn, 
implies that the pursuit of one goal might impede the achievement of others. Pursuing 
customer satisfaction, for example, might negatively affect overall financial outcomes. 
Importantly, when managers can select the goals, they can justify their decisions in terms 
most favorable to them (Audia & Brion, 2007). Such increases in managers’ potential to 
pursue personal interests instead of goals set by stakeholders are counterbalanced by 
increases in organizational constraints that reduce managerial discretion.  
In addition, when one or more goals are ambiguous or less measurable, managers 
are likely to respond with effort distortion by shifting attention to more measurable goals 
(Kerr, 1975), or even introducing more targets as circumstances change (Adner & 
Levinthal, 2004). In such cases, it is difficult for stakeholders to measure organizational 
outcomes, that is, to determine whether poor outcomes are a consequence of ambiguous 
goals or managerial shirking. Thus, to monitor managerial behavior, stakeholders may 
introduce a bureaucracy that includes fairly rigid and specific guidelines, routines, rules, 




these restrictions are unnecessary for stakeholders in organizations with a single, clear 
goal.  
Managerial discretion under a particular ownership type is thus viewed as 
spanning a continuum that reflects the relationship between organizational goals and 
organizational constraints, as summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: As the number and ambiguity of goals increases, managerial 
discretion decreases. 
 
This proposition then raises the question of how organizational goals might differ 
across for-profit, government, and not-for-profit organizations. Government 
organizations exist to effect policy established by legislative enactment or executive 
order (Peabody & Rourke, 1965; Perry & Rainey, 1988). Apart from making the most 
economical use of resources, these organizations are obliged to serve the public interest 
to the best of their ability. The goals of government organizations include, for example, 
regional planning (Tennessee Valley Authority) or improvements in driver safety 
(departments of transportation), and are thus often numerous, unordered, vague, and 
ambiguous (Banfield, 1961; Dewatripont, Jewitt, & Tirole, 1999; Perry & Rainey, 1988). 
Not-for-profit organizations, like government organizations, exist to serve the needs of 
various constituencies, but unlike government organizations they are expected to generate 
revenues to support their social obligations. One such example can be seen in the goal of 
Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, or MSF), which is to provide 




epidemics, or natural disasters when local health systems fail. The socially desirable 
goods or services delivered by not-for-profit organizations, however, are provided by 
their constituencies (or donors) rather than through government subsidies. In marked 
contrast to government and not-for-profit organizations, for-profit organizations exist to 
achieve the overarching agreed upon goal of profit maximization. 
The goals of these three types of ownership clearly vary in terms of number and 
ambiguity. The ambiguity of the goals of not-for-profit organizations will lie between the 
single goal of for-profit organizations and the numerous and ambiguous goals of 
government organizations. Although both not-for-profit and government organizations 
strive to achieve multiple goals (e.g., charitable, educational, and humanitarian), the 
former’s limited resources and need to cover costs allow for a clearer demarcation of the 
boundaries within which managers can pursue their goals. Although it might be argued 
that not-for-profit organizations have only the single goal of maximizing value for all 
stakeholders (donors, communities, and so forth), the more general view is that the need 
to serve multiple constituencies will nevertheless generate the tradeoffs managers need to 
make in their day-to-day decision-making (Jensen, 2001). 
I expect the differences in goals across these three types of ownership to be 
associated with different levels of managerial discretion. The unambiguous goal of profit 
maximization of for-profit organizations relieves stakeholders of the need to exercise 
much control over managerial action, and thus is expected to be associated with a high 
level of discretion. Conversely, the multiple, ambiguous goals of government 
organizations impede incentive alignment between managers and stakeholders and 




scrutiny, and thus are expected to be associated with a low level of managerial discretion 
(Dewatripont et al., 1999; Dixit, 2002). Further, because of the unlimited ability of 
government to raise taxes, I expect managerial discretion in actions in pursuit of goals 
that constitute the social welfare agenda to be severely constrained (Lioukas, Bourantas, 
& Papadakis, 1993). The level of managerial discretion associated with not-for-profit 
organizations, the goals of which will be clearer than those of government, but more 
ambiguous than those of for-profit, organizations will lie somewhere in between, giving 
rise to the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: The level of managerial discretion will be highest in for-profit, 
lowest in government, and lie somewhere in between in not-for-profit organizations. 
 
In summary, different types of ownership lead to different levels of managerial 
discretion. These differences arise from organizational goals that vary across ownership 
types, and the necessity to introduce compensating constraints to control for managerial 
behavior. Emerging from this rationale are specific hypotheses regarding how these types 
of ownership affect managerial behavior in the research context, namely, the hospital 
industry. 
 
3.4. Empirical Context 
I test my theory and propositions using data from the hospital industry, which is 
well suited to this study for the following reasons. The hospital industry has features that 




important. In the hospital industry, the goals of the three prevailing ownership types vary, 
together with the behavior of the key organizational members, namely the physicians.   
More importantly, what makes the hospital industry particularly attractive as an 
empirical setting is that the direct effect of ownership on managerial behavior can be 
more readily determined. If incentive alignment was its only determinant, it is hard to 
observe a relationship between ownership type and managerial behavior because, as 
pointed out by Demsetz and colleagues (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001), ownership types and incentives are simultaneously chosen 
to induce optimal managerial behavior. In this regard, Demsetz argued that under a 
dispersed ownership, the negative impact on performance of, for example, shirking or 
consumption of amenities will be offset by a newly-adjusted incentive system. Given that 
incentive systems can be adapted to ownership type, there should be no direct 
relationship between ownership type and managerial behavior (Demsetz, 1983). I propose, 
however, that, owing to features apart from stock dispersion (which represents the 
incentive alignment mechanism), ownership type does have a direct effect on managerial 
behavior. In order to empirically identify this effect, I need a setting where some 
exogenous shock induces a shift in managerial behavior without affecting ownership 
types or incentive systems, which will then allow me to trace the relationship between ex 
ante differences in ownership types and changes in managerial behavior in response to 
the shock. One such shock is the threat of malpractice liability in the hospital industry. 
This threat is well suited to this study because it can be expected to do just that, generate 
changes in physician behavior but not in hospital incentive systems or ownership type, at 




The threat of malpractice liability is likely to lead physicians to provide medical 
care that is not, or is perhaps only marginally, beneficial, or to withhold beneficial care 
that is perceived to be risky (Danzon, 1991; Sloan & Shadle, 2009). For example, 
physicians order unnecessary tests and drugs in order to have their choices better 
defended against future litigation. Such liability-induced changes in physician behavior 
would have not occurred in the absence of liability and are expected to entail costs in 
excess of benefits (Danzon, 1991). 
The effect of the threat of malpractice liability on physician practice patterns is 
empirically well documented (Baicker, Fisher, & Chandra, 2007; Dubay, Kaestner, & 
Waidmann, 2001; Kessler & McClellan, 1996; Localio et al., 1993). For instance, many 
researchers have found that concerns about malpractice liability lead physicians to order 
unnecessary procedures. Examples include Localio et al. (1993), who found that the 
probability that a child will be delivered by Cesarean section increases under the threat of 
medical malpractice, and Kessler and McClellan (1996), who found that high malpractice 
liability pressure is associated with more intense hospital care and higher subsequent 
payment in the context of acute myocardial infarction and ischemic heart disease. 
Another study recently found that a 10% increase in malpractice payments per physician 
is associated with a 1.0% increase in Medicare expenditures for physician services, with 
no effect on mortality rates (Baicker et al., 2007). Other studies have identified the 
avoidance of high-risk patients or procedures as liability-induced changes in medical 
practice. For example, Dubay et al. (2001) found that in the presence of a greater threat of 
malpractice liability, prenatal care is likely to be delayed and prenatal visits fewer, with 




observe such selection-based defensive behavior, I narrow my scope to changes in 
managerial behavior as reflected in increasing ordering of tests in response to large 
malpractice shocks.   
Following previous studies, I posit that sudden increases in malpractice awards, 
which proxy for the threat of malpractice lawsuits, will change physician behavior in 
ways that will be reflected in increases in hospital expenditures. Given that physicians 
and hospitals in the same state are judged by the same legal standard, I assume that a 
sudden increase in the threat of malpractice liability in a given state affects not only 
physicians engaged in the litigation, but also other physicians working in other hospitals 
in the same state. When doctors see their colleagues penalized in a finding of malpractice, 
concerns about being sued or having credibility damaged arise, leading to defensive 
strategies. The lack of an observable impact on the overall quality of medical care 
notwithstanding, I argue that doctors are likely to order unnecessary tests and prescribe 
unneeded drugs to better defend themselves in future litigation, and that this defensive 
behavior will be translated into increases in hospital expenditures.  
Hypothesis 1: Increases in malpractice awards are associated with increases in 
hospital expenditures 
 
This raises the question of the role of ownership type in the setting of the threat of 
malpractice liability. I expect that the magnitude of physicians’ responses, again 
translated into increases in hospital expenditures, to the threat of malpractice liability will 




threat of malpractice liability inducing physicians to change their behavior, to the extent 
that organizational constraints allow physicians to do so. When facing strong 
organizational constraints, physicians with low discretion may not be able to respond to 
the threat of malpractice liability, even if they want to. By the same token, weak 
organizational constraints and a corresponding high level of discretion will allow 
physicians to respond to the threat relatively freely.  
Consistent with my propositions that theorized different levels of discretion in 
three types of ownership, I expect increases in expenditures in response to sudden 
increases in malpractice awards to be highest in for-profit, lowest in government, and 
intermediate in not-for-profit hospitals. Physicians working in high discretion for-profit 
hospitals without strong constraints are likely to change their behavior by ordering tests 
and prescribing unnecessary drugs, and thus increase hospital expenditures the most. 
Those working in low discretion government hospitals are likely to increase costs less 
than those in high discretion for-profit hospitals because stringent guidelines and rigorous 
monitoring systems in government hospitals restrict such defensive behavior. The 
intensity of the responses of physicians working in medium discretion not-for-profit 
hospitals will lie somewhere between these extremes. These expectations are summarized 
in the following hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 2a: Increases in malpractice awards are associated with greater 
increases in expenditures in for-profit hospitals than in not-for-profit hospitals 
Hypothesis 2b: Increases in malpractice awards are associated with smaller 




3.5. Quantitative Study Design 
3.5.1. Sample and Data 
The present study draws on multiple sources for data. The Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) provides complete hospital cost reports for every year 
since 1997.10
 
 From these reports, I collected hospital expenditure data in 6,000 hospitals 
across 50 states and the District of Columbia over the period 1997-2006. This data source 
represents 92% of the 6,500 hospitals in the United States. Data on total malpractice 
awards paid by all health insurance firms in every state over the period 1996-2005 was 
obtained from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The 2,787 
property/casualty insurers that generated the annual statements from which NAIC obtains 
its data account for more than 95% of the malpractice policies written in the United 
States. I obtained data on hospital incentive systems from a survey conducted annually by 
the American Hospital Association (AHA). Lastly, data on household income by county 
was collected from U.S. Census Bureau small area income and poverty estimates. 
3.5.2. Variable Definitions and Operationalization 
Dependent Variable 
Hospital Expenditures: The dependent variable is the logarithm of hospital expenditures 
by department. CMS data on subsets of hospital expenditures by department ranges from 
capital related costs and costs of interns and residence programs to costs of laundry and 
                                                 
10 I generated a new “year” variable after taking into account fiscal year end and begin dates. 




linen, housekeeping, and dietary services, to cafeteria costs. Because some subcategories 
of hospital expenditures are not directly relevant to the current study, instead of using 
total hospital expenditures, I develop a unique dependent variable by creating 
expenditures for operating room, radiology diagnostic, drugs, emergency room, and 
adults and pediatrics departments by summing for each the value of old/new building and 
movable equipment costs, employee benefits, administrative and general costs, non-
physician anesthetists, nursing school costs, interns and residents’ salaries and fringes, 
and costs of interns and residence programs and paramedical education. The department-
level expenditures represent the aggregate dollar impact of the physicians’ decisions in 
the respective hospital-department pair in each year. Because I use hospital fixed effects 
in all my estimations, it is within-hospital changes in expenditures that I am interested in 
explaining. Other aspects held constant, I argue that within-hospital year-over-year 
changes in departmental costs in response to variations in malpractice award shocks (at 
the state-level) represent actions. The magnitude of the change in these costs is a proxy 
for the managerial discretion enjoyed by physicians. Of course, other factors such as 
changes in the size of the hospital or other demand characteristics might also affect 
hospital costs so it is important to control for these other explanations. 
 
Independent Variables 
Malpractice Insurance Awards: I use the state level malpractice awards each year to 
assess the impact of the threat of malpractice suits for one year on the following year’s 
hospital expenditures. The higher the malpractice insurance awards (i.e., malpractice 




be uniform at the state-level because this is the level at which the U.S. tort law system is 
mostly enforced.11
Hospital Ownership Types: I created two dummy variables for the study, one for for-




I control for a number of hospital characteristics that can affect physician behavior.  
Number of Patients: This number is measured as the logarithm of the total number of 
patients at each hospital.  
Market Share by Department: Because hospitals with greater market share can charge 
more for their services (i.e., monopoly profits), I created a variable for each hospital’s 
market share based on hospital expenditure by department. Each hospital’s departmental 
expenditures are divided by total departmental expenditures for a given county. This is 
because I assume that all hospitals within a county constitute the relevant competitor set 
from the standpoint of the patient.  
Uncompensated Costs Ratio: The uncompensated costs ratio is calculated by dividing 
total uncompensated costs by total hospital expenditures. Uncompensated costs refer to 
costs incurred when patients who visit emergency rooms are subsequently unable to pay 
for the cost of care either because they do not carry insurance or are too indigent to pay 
for the cost of care. High levels of uncompensated costs imply that a hospital is under 
                                                 
11  According to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, 95 percent of lawsuits over torts are 




pressure to make up for these losses in other profitable parts of the hospital. One way to 
do so is by ordering excessive procedures and tests.  
Hospital Incentive System: Physician-hospital arrangements include independent 
practice associations, open physician hospital organizations, closed physician 
organizations, management service organizations, foundation models, and integrated 
salary models. It has been suggested that these arrangements form a continuum based on 
the degree of integration between a hospital and its physician groups (Cuellar & Gertler, 
2006). The integrated salary model (ISM), in which physicians are salaried hospital 
employees, represents the tightest form of integration. Expecting physicians’ and hospital 
stakeholders’ incentives to be closely aligned under this arrangement and hospital 
expenditures to consequently be lower under ISM than under other arrangements, I 
created and included a dummy variable for hospitals that operate under ISM.  
Dummy for General Hospitals: The extent to which each department (e.g., operating 
room, radiology diagnostic, drugs, emergency room, and adults and pediatrics 
departments) is utilized will vary with the type of medical procedures performed. To take 
extreme cases, a patient with a cold may visit the out-patient department of a general 
hospital and be treated without radiology diagnostic procedures, whereas a cancer patient 
may visit specialist hospitals and undergo multiple diagnostic procedures. I control for 
hospital specialty by including a dummy for general hospitals. Long-term/short-term 
general hospitals are coded 1, while hospitals that specialize in cancer, children, 




Household Income by County: I expect hospital expenditures to be higher for hospitals 
located in high-income counties than for hospitals located in low-income counties. Thus, 
I include the one-year lagged logarithm of median household income in the model.  
 
3.5.3. Model Specification 
I estimate hospital expenditures using a fixed effects (by hospital) regression on 
panel data from 1997 to 2006. I expect malpractice awards in year (t-1) to affect hospital 
expenditure in year (t). Thus, the interaction terms (awards*ownership) are also lagged in 
the model. Note that because the hospital fixed effect is included, the main effects of 
ownership type are subsumed within the fixed effect. The interaction term between 
malpractice insurance awards and hospital ownership type is used in the model when 
testing hypotheses H2 and Hb. In other words, the study focuses on the interaction term 
between malpractice awards and the for-profit hospital dummy, and the interaction term 
between malpractice awards and the government hospital dummy (β2: the main variables 
of interest). I employ the following model 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 
=  β1𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡−1 + β2𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑠,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 + α𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where Control is a vector of control variables, including patient number, market share by 
department, uncompensated costs, hospital incentive system, the dummy for general 




hospital fixed effects. The subscript s represents the state of each hospital. The subscript t 
refers to year, and the subscript i means hospital. 
 
3.6. Qualitative Study Design 
I undertake a qualitative study to understand how different ownership types 
impose organizational constraints on managerial behavior. The qualitative design is 
critical because organizational constraints, which are the key mechanism that links 
ownership type and managerial discretion, are not observed in my quantitative study 
design. To provide robust support for my theory, I examine the nature and magnitude of 
the organizational constraints, such as performance feedback, peer pressure, bureaucracy, 
financial constraints, protocols, and guidelines, each ownership type imposes on 
physicians (see Appendix 1).  
 
3.6.1. Research Sites 
I collect primary data in the wake of a pilot study that involved nine interviews 
conducted within the University of Michigan Health System (UMHS). The interviews 
indicate that different ownership types employ different organizational constraints. 
Although these pilot interviews at UMHS mostly explain organizational constraints in a 
government hospital, physicians with experiences in organizations with different 
ownership types (e.g., in government and for-profit hospitals) provide information about 
how these affect physician behavior (e.g., strong constraints in government hospitals vs. 




The primary data collection involves interviews conducted in different states. 
Because standards and regulations for medical practice vary by state in the United States, 
it is necessary to include more than two states for the purposes of comparison. The cap 
for damages awards in malpractice suits, for example, varies by state, and because 
hospitals within a state operate under the same jurisdiction, many hospitals in the same 
state will pay attention to judgments in large malpractice lawsuits and subsequently 
become more defensive in terms of treatment practices. Drawing the sample of research 
sites from hospitals located in several states should overcome the state-specific bias that 
might otherwise be generated by this circumstance.  
Because physician behavior might be expected to vary with demand size, which is 
measured by customer income, I choose research sites based on state and county poverty 
rates as of 2001, a median year for the period of the quantitative dataset (1997-2006). I 
choose six states that represent a selection of wealthy (Connecticut, New Hampshire), 
middle income (Ohio, Michigan), and poor states (Mississippi, Louisiana), and selected 
hospitals located in the counties that best represent each state’s poverty rate (see 
Appendix 2).  
 
3.6.2. Data Sources 
Following Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004), I conduct at least two physicians and 
two hospital administrators at each hospital in order to minimize information bias. The 
hospital industry is unique in that it consists of multiple hierarchies, including the 




among organization members. Physicians and hospital administrators are thus likely to 
have different perspectives on how ownership type affects physician behavior. For 
example, because they likely take it for granted, hospital administrators in a government 
hospital may not even recognize the importance of control over organizational activities. 
However, physicians in the same hospital may feel so frustrated that they overly 
emphasize their loss of professional independence within the organization.  
I have conducted both face-to-face and telephone interviews with physicians and 
hospital administrators in Michigan and other states since July 2010. All interviews for 
which permission is given are audio taped; otherwise, I take extensive notes and prepare 
a summary on completion of the interview. Interviews average forty minutes, but may be 
as long as ninety minutes if time permits. Interviewees receive no payment.  
 
3.7. Results 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables 
used to explain hospital expenditures. The high correlations between hospital 
expenditures were expected, and are not problematic because I estimate hospital 
expenditure for operating room, radiology diagnostic, drugs, emergency room, and adults 
and pediatrics departments independently. Neither are the high correlations between 
market share variables, which were also expected, problematic because I include each 
market share variable respectively when estimating hospital expenditure by department.  




Table 3 presents the results of the hospital fixed effects regression models used to 
assess the interaction effect between the threat of malpractice liability and ownership type 
on hospital expenditures. Models 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 present the results of the main effect of 
the threat of malpractice liability (hypothesis 1); Models 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 provide the 
results of hypotheses 2a and 2b.  
I find that the threat of malpractice liability measured by state-level malpractice 
awards affects physician behavior in all departments (model 1-model 10). Because both 
the dependent and independent variable are log-transformed, I can conclude that a 10% 
increase in malpractice awards (amounting to $18,600,000) will yield a 0.1% increase in 
hospital expenditures in operating room (amounting to $2,208), a 0.13% increase in 
radiology diagnostic (amounting to $1,975), a 0.25% increase in drugs (amounting to 
$1,665), a 0.12% increase in emergency room (amounting to $1,401), and a 0.12% 
increase in adults and pediatrics departments (amounting to $5,556).  
The coefficients on the interaction term for for-profit hospitals specified in 
hypothesis 2a are positive and statistically significant for operating room, drugs, and 
emergency room departments (model 2, 6, and 8). This suggests that increases in 
malpractice awards are likely to incur greater increases in expenditures in for-profit 
hospitals than in not-for-profit hospitals. I thus find support for hypothesis 2a. A 10% 
percent increase in malpractice awards (amounting to $18,600,000) should lead to a 
greater increase in expenditures in for-profit hospitals than for not-for-profit hospitals by 
0.01% for operating room (amounting to $184), 0.09% for drugs (amounting to $628), 




The coefficient on the interaction term for government hospitals is negative and 
statistically significant for operating room, radiology diagnostic, emergency room, and 
adults and pediatrics departments (model 2, 4, 8, and 10). This suggests that, in response 
to increases in malpractice awards, government hospitals are likely to increase hospital 
expenditures less than not-for-profit hospitals, which provides support for hypothesis 2b. 
A 10% increase in malpractice awards (amounting to $18,600,000) should increase 
expenditures in government hospitals less compared to not-for-profit hospitals by 0.04% 
for operating room (amounting to $463), 0.04% for radiology diagnostic (amounting to 
$376), 0.04% for emergency room (amounting to $315), and 0.03% for adults and 
pediatrics departments (amounting to $815). 
Results from the qualitative study support my theory that government hospitals 
impose strong (low discretion), and for-profit hospitals extremely weak (high discretion), 
organizational constraints.12
 
 For instance, interviews with physicians at the University of 
Michigan Health System (UMHS) indicate that government hospitals impose strong 
organizational constraints. As observed by one informant now working at a government 
hospital (UMHS), 
… [E]very month I am given a little financial report of where I am, what they 
expect, whether I am meeting those financial goals…which is not what is 
happening in [the for-profit] hospital. 
                                                 






Having previously worked in a for-profit hospital, he was able to provide this comparison. 
Interviews with physicians and hospital administrators support my key mechanism; 
different levels of organizational constraints that I do not observe in the quantitative 
study.  
 
3.8. Discussion and Conclusion 
The current study examines the effect of ownership type (for-profit, government, 
and not-for-profit) on managerial discretion. I argue that stakeholders limit managerial 
discretion by imposing constraints, the extent of which are a function of the ambiguity 
and number of organizational goals. When organizational goals are clear and few in 
number, stakeholders are likely to impose weak organizational constraints that yield a 
high level of managerial discretion, because they can more accurately assess performance 
and therefore believe managers to have little room to pursue personal objectives. 
Conversely, when organizational goals are vague and many, stakeholders are inclined to 
impose strong organizational constraints that yield a low level of managerial discretion, 
because they find it difficult to determine whether poor performance is goal induced or a 
consequence of managerial shirking and believe managers are likely to pursue their own 
interests. I expect the differences in goals reflected in the three types of ownership —for-
profit, government, and not-for-profit — to be associated with different levels of 
managerial discretion. Specifically, I hypothesize that the level of managerial discretion 




for-profit organizations. Consistent with my hypotheses, my findings suggest that in 
response to sudden increases in malpractice awards, physicians working in for-profit 
hospitals will be more likely, and physicians working in government hospitals less likely, 
than physicians working in not-for-profit hospitals to engage in defensive behavior.  
This study offers two important takeaways. First, an important implication of my 
study is that the choice of ownership type is not simply a means to an end. Previous 
research argues that managerial behavior does not vary with ownership type because for a 
given ownership type, incentives are chosen to induce optimal managerial behavior 
(Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). If this 
perspective is accurate, the choice of ownership type becomes inconsequential. However, 
my theory and findings suggest the opposite, that the choice of ownership type is an end 
in itself. Ownership types (an end) that embody different goals differentially determine 
organizational constraints (a means) that guide managerial behavior. Thus, my 
contribution to the literature on ownership is revealing that the choice of ownership type, 
in fact, is consequential for managerial behavior.  
Moreover, by demonstrating the relationship between ownership type and the 
range of strategic means available to managers, my study sheds some light on the relation 
between ownership and the size of the surplus. Previous research on ownership type has 
typically emphasized the importance of restricting managerial discretion via incentive 
alignment (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This approach is problematic in two ways. One is that this approach overly 
restricts the effect of ownership type to the division of surplus between managers and 




remuneration and perks at the expense of the profits of owners. The other problem is that 
considering incentive alignment only may not allow us to properly elucidate how 
ownership type narrows or broadens managerial discretion. Lacking strong assumptions 
about managerial behavior and emphasizing the subtle influence of organizational 
mechanisms on managerial discretion (in addition to incentive alignment mechanism), 
my study carefully examines how ownership type affects managerial discretion, which is 
the essential foundation for performance differences within an industry (Bertrand & 
Schoar, 2003; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Therefore, my study advances our 
understanding of the linkage between ownership type and the size of the surplus that has 
received relatively scant attention.  
My study, like empirical studies generally, is not without limitations. First, the 
quality of hospital care was not controlled for. The amount spent to serve patients would 
be higher for high quality hospitals than for low quality hospitals. Despite the importance 
of controlling for quality to an explanation of changes in expenditures in response to the 
threat of malpractice liability, I was unable to collect data on this variable over the full 
data period. However, when I combined a three-year dataset (2004-2006) on the quality 
ratio collected from CMS “hospital compare” with the full dataset, results were largely 
similar to those of an estimation that did not control for the quality of hospital care 
reported in the Table 3. Second, some may question whether outcome control (restricting 
managers’ freedom to pursue personal objectives over those of stakeholders) and 
behavior control (restricting the range of strategic means) are really endogenously chosen, 
as I posit. Contrary to my prediction, stakeholders who can easily assess organizational 




multiple, vague goals find it difficult to choose appropriate guidelines and rules that 
influence managers to pursue organizational goals. This suggests the possibility that 
outcome control and behavioral control may, in fact, be complements rather than 
substitutes. Because this possibility leads to predictions opposite to what I hypothesize, 
failing to address this issue might weaken the results of my study. While these are clear 
limitations, by conducting interviews with physicians, I am able to (1) validate whether 
differences in hospital expenditures across ownership types (which I observe in my 
empirical study) are due to organizational constraints, and (2) determine whether 
outcome control and behavioral control are substitutes or complements. That is, my 





4. HOW MANAGERIAL DISCRETION VARIES ACROSS FIRM BOUNDARIES 
4.1. Introduction 
A widely held view in transaction cost economics (TCE) is that firms exist to 
reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1981). They accomplish this by 
limiting opportunities for transacting parties to profit from contractual impasses through 
hierarchy and fiat (Williamson, 1975). Thus, the central thesis of TCE is that changes in 
managerial behavior occur when a transaction shifts from the market into the firm 
because firms serve to limit the opportunistic behavior encouraged in the market. In sum, 
when the transaction shifts from the market to the firm, managers’ freedom to 
opportunistically pursue personal objectives diminishes.  
Although scholars have studied the mechanisms that underlie decreases in 
transaction cost when opportunistic behavior is limited (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 
1981; Williamson, 1985), understanding of how moving from the market to the firm 
might introduce other organizational costs remains limited (Hart, 2011; Masten, Meehan, 
& Snyder, 1991; Miller, 1993; Zenger, Felin, & Bigelow, 2011). To explicate the 
organizational costs imposed by integration, the present study highlights four 
organizational tools, that is, authority, rewards, identification, and coordination (Simon, 
1991). While firms use these organizational tools to reduce managers’ freedom to pursue 




transactions within the firm, using these tools to realize these benefits may also generate 
other additional organizational costs that would not be present in the corresponding 
market exchange. My dissertation investigates the organizational costs incurred when 
transactions are governed within the firm.  
In the absence of a specific theory that outlines the organizational costs of 
integration, I undertake an in-depth, qualitative study using a rigorous case methodology, 
which, according to Yin (2009), is the appropriate research method when asking “how” 
explanatory research questions. Especially, I make the qualitative interviews the method 
of choice because hearing from organizational members whose behaviors interrelate can 
help us develop a holistic description of how a complex entity works or fails (Weiss, 
1995). Thus, this methodology enables me to describe the process by which managerial 
behavior changes as transactions move from the market to the firm, and the 
organizational costs that result from this change.  
This study makes two principal contributions to the extant literature. First, it 
emphasizes the importance of organizational costs. Although they have emphasized that 
within firms managerial behavior veers away from opportunism, scholars have paid less 
attention to how moving a transaction from the market to the firm incurs other 
organizational costs by eliciting managerial behaviors associated with organizations as 
opposed to markets. I conclude from my exploration of the underexplored, yet important, 
organizational costs that the emphasis on the costs of opportunism understates the true 
organizational costs of integration. Because certain organizational costs lack counterparts 
in the market, complexities emerge in the process of comparing costs that adjudicate 




the current study also helps to illuminate the micro-foundations of managerial discretion. 
Through interviews, I examine, at a micro level, how managerial behavior would be 
different between the market and the firm, which has not been studied in the extant 
empirical studies on managerial discretion. By examining variation both within and 
outside firms, the present study enhances understanding of the determinants of 
managerial discretion. 
 
4.2. Prior Literature  
The core idea of TCE is that market costs that arise from opportunism are the 
main drivers of integration. The concept of bounded rationality in TCE (Cyert & March, 
1963; Simon, 1957; Williamson, 1981) ensures that any contract between two agents in 
the marketplace will be essentially incomplete in the sense that contingencies will arise 
that will demand adaptation not specified ex ante in the contract. That adaptation is not a 
problem if actors can easily agree on the resolution of disputes is where the key 
assumption of TCE, that actors are opportunistic pursuers of self-interest with guile 
(Williamson, 1975), becomes crucial. Opportunistic behavior on the parts of all parties to 
transactions increases the cost of transacting in the market due to the need for speedy and 
effective court resolution of disputes. TCE posits that the market costs that arise from 
opportunism can be reduced by shifting transactions from the market to the firm, where 
opportunistic behavior can be limited (Williamson, 1975). 
What enables the reduction in the market costs that arise from opportunism are a 




coordination, which are brought to bear when a transaction is shifted from the market to 
the firm (Simon, 1991). The intent of these tools is not only to reduce opportunistic 
behavior, but also to facilitate coordination among organizational members. The 
organizational benefits that accrue to the deployment of these tools, however, may be 
accompanied by organizational costs that do not correspond to any market costs. The 
emergence of these costs suggests that the firm boundary decision is not a matter of 
simply comparing opportunism costs between firms and markets. To better understand 
this complex firm boundary decision, it is important to understand organizational costs as 
well as benefits that are generated by integration. In this chapter, I first review the 
relevant stream of literature on several organizational benefits and costs that each 
organizational tool introduces.  
 
4.2.1. Rewards 
One noticeable organizational tool is the rewards system (Simon, 1991). In the 
market, rewards systems are high-powered, in the firm, low-powered (Williamson, 1985). 
The levels of power in the rewards systems imply the extent to which the gross receipts 
of the economic agent are influenced by the efforts expended by the agent. Although high 
powered rewards systems in the firm might help induce actors to work hard to increase 
their personal earnings, they encourage actors to exploit every contingency (or even 
actively create contingencies) to generate advantages for themselves in any ex post 
negotiations (Williamson, 1981). However, actors within firms are less likely to behave 
opportunistically, because effort and productivity do not directly affect personal rewards 




incentives for employees to pursue personal interests (Williamson, 1975), as TCE posits, 
enables firms to reduce transaction costs. Based on this rationale, TCE has evolved in a 
way that suggests that properties like frequency, uncertainty, and asset specificity 
increase the likelihood that transaction costs will increase due to opportunistic behavior 
(Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Nickerson & Silverman, 2003; Pisano, 1990; Williamson, 
1981). Aspects apart from changes in opportunistic behavior are assumed to be held 
constant when a transaction shifts from the market to the firm. In other words, TCE offers 
little, if any, explanation of what such changes in boundary decisions might entail in the 
way of other organizational costs.  
This new rewards system is not without cost, however. In the market, actors’ 
rewards are determined by supply and demand, within a firm, by central actors with 
authority. When high-powered incentives are replaced with low-powered incentives, less 
effort and shirking are more likely to be observed among those who cannot lay claim to 
the net receipts within the organization than in the market. Thus, within a firm, a reward 
system incurs costs of collecting information, that is, costs that arise as firms collect 
information about employee behaviors like productivity or shirking. Based on the 
detailed information collected, firms attempt to grant raises or promotions that can reflect 
individuals’ contributions to organizational outcomes, inducing employees to work hard. 
Another cost that may be generated by rewards systems in firms is termed social 
comparison costs (Zenger et al., 2011). In the face of incomplete information that 
prevents the perfect division of jointly-produced gains according to individual 
contribution or performance (Holmstrom, 1982), firms cannot easily extract employees’ 




imperfect information to be free-riding and shirking cannot simply be replaced quickly 
with harder working employees, managers knowing this often will not work as hard 
within a firm as in the market. Thus, some managers would feel that they are not properly 
compensated for individual performance. This unfairness in rewards systems is thus 
likely to be perceived when actors compare their rewards with those of others in the same 
firm, but not with those of actors outside the firm, and to generate myriad responses that 
undermine efficiency (Zenger et al., 2011). Managers might, for example, reduce their 
level of effort or attempt to influence or lobby for contingent rewards (Zenger et al., 
2011). These social comparison costs, that is, organizational costs associated with 
members within a firm as a reference group, do not exist or are less severe in the market.  
 
4.2.2. Authority 
Rewards, as mentioned above, are insufficient to motivate workers completely 
(Gibbons, 2010), because in a world of uncertainty, contracts that specify rewards cannot 
predict all future contingencies. Adjusting incentives to each unexpected condition is 
costly, and often not an option because of the immediacy with which action needs to be 
taken. The costs generated by incomplete incentives can be avoided inside the firm 
because bargaining is replaced by authority (Coase, 1937; Simon, 1991); those who 
possess authority design employees’ behavior by telling employees what to do, and 
employees follow these instructions when the decision criteria resides within their zone 
of acceptance (Simon, 1991). Authority facilitates coordination by determining employee 




costs associated with bargaining and hold-ups (Simon, 1951, 1991), and forestalling 
delays in information processing (Radner, 1992). 
Unfortunately, authority enforcement within firms is subject to inefficiencies in 
communication. Because subordinates are often better informed than the authorities 
responsible for decisions about projects’ use of firm assets, the latters’ initiation of 
directives often relies on soliciting information from the former. If poorly informed, those 
with authority will make mistakes by issuing suboptimal orders. Despite the importance 
of communication between these parties, information flow between them is often 
complicated by the fact of authority. Specifically, subordinates lack incentives to acquire 
and share information (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). Subordinates worried that their efforts to 
collect information that contributes to the choice of an optimal project might be wasted 
are likely to be uninterested in communicating with those with authority about potential 
projects’ payoffs (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). This communication bottleneck is exacerbated 
in the case of soft information, that is, information that, because it cannot be directly 
verified by other than those who created it, cannot be easily passed on to others (Stein, 
2002). Subordinates’ anticipation that the likelihood of their effort being wasted is higher 
for the collection of soft than for the collection of hard information (i.e., information 
relatively easily passed on to superiors) will dilute their incentives to collect and share 
soft information.  
An extreme case of authority-related communication problems is the cost of 
influence activities, termed influence costs (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom & Roberts, 1988). 
Given information asymmetry whereby superiors’ access to information is inferior to 




decision makers in authority (Milgrom & Roberts, 1988). The flow of information to 
superiors might, for example, be influenced such that projects that entail less effort by, 
and generate better career paths for, subordinates will be chosen (Stein, 2002). Influence 
activities, such as providing false or incomplete information to decision makers, may 
shape decisions to the benefit of workers, but increase the costs of filtering, and 
collecting additional, information. These costs will eventually degrade the decision 
quality of the central authority, and workers’ undue attention to influence activities over 
productive activities is, in itself, a serious problem.  
In sum, authorities’ direction of subordinates, even as it promotes coordination 
benefits, to the extent that it also impedes communication between superiors and 




Thirdly, Simon (1991) argues that identification, like authority, is an important 
organizational tool that differentiates the market from the firm. Identification based on 
organizational pride and loyalty can compel employees to actively work towards 
organizational goals and deter the opportunistic behavior that prevails in the market. 
Because organizational outcomes are more highly valued by those who identify with the 
organization, workers will require less reward with than without identification (Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2005). Shared identity with a firm is particularly important because 




improvement. One means of generating superior performance is to create imperfectly re-
deployable resources that require firm-specific human capital. But employees who make 
firm-specific investments are confronted with hold-up problems. After the investment in 
human capital is made, employers may force employees to accept, for instance, reduced 
compensation and extended work hours (Wang, He, & Mahoney, 2009). Thus, employees 
reluctant to put themselves in situations in which they face such hold-up problems avoid 
human capital investments. To solve these problems, firms employ trust and shared 
identity that show that they will not engage in opportunistic behavior towards their 
employees, and elicit the optimal level of commitment from employees.  
This raises the important question of how identification is enforced. Identification, 
like other tools that play a key role in the firm, requires investment. Being an outcome of 
discriminating between “we” and “they,” the identification requires that firms invest in 
motivational capital to instill in employees a sense of “we.” Firm-sponsored events 
intended to enhance trust and build legitimacy (e.g., group lunches, employee sporting 
activities, and other company gatherings) may help to inculcate a sense of identity in 
employees (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005). Similarly, paying employees above-market wages, 
according to Akerlof (2010), encourages them to think highly of themselves and their 
company, and thus high esteem, in turn, leads employees to work hard and perform well 
in order to justify their superiority. Understudied, but nevertheless important, investments 
in motivational capital add one layer of organizational costs to the process of integration. 
Identification can, however, be a case of too much of a good thing. The extent to 
which excessive reliance on it impedes efforts to increase efficiency translates into social 




or among employees being particularly embedded, firms cannot simply discard or ignore 
previous relationships, even when they no longer benefit the organization. Interpersonal 
relationships, for example, may lead employers to say yes to R&D projects that are 
unlikely to contribute positively to firm outcomes. Unpromising projects that go forward 
and promising ones that are shelved in the interest of cultivating employee trust may not 
only hamper performance, but even jeopardize contracts with outside parties that, wary of 
such behavior, are led to rethink or terminate their relationships. Such social attachment 
costs add yet another layer to the organizational cost that accompanies integration. 
 
4.2.4. Coordination 
Last, but not least, the feature that differs from market to firm is coordination as 
an organizational tool. Firms can coordinate activities in ways not as easily achieved by 
markets (Simon, 1991). In the market, a series of activities to be coordinated may incur 
hold-up costs as parties haggle over investment in relationship-specific transactions 
across coordinated units. Firms can deter such opportunistic behavior and harmoniously 
coordinate transactions by integrating units. Within firm coordination is facilitated by two 
mechanisms (Camerer & Knez, 1996). The first is direct supervision: those with authority 
hand down decisions related to coordinating activities and thereby reduce or eliminate 
haggling costs (Coase, 1937). Negotiating unexpected events not covered by a contract 
can be avoided by those with authority by using the firm’s information advantage over 
the market to evaluate the prospect and direct the use of the assets it oversees. Firms may 
also direct the optimal allocation of resources and individual action (e.g., promote 




facilitates coordination. Because employees expect cooperation from fellow workers and 
share common expectations about appropriate forms of behavior (Camerer & Knez, 
1996), firms can coordinate actions essentially by “telepathy,” that is, achieve 
coordination in a timely manner with a reduced level of information sharing (Puranam & 
Gulati, 2008). In sum, direct supervision and mutual adjustment can be used by firms to 
coordinate actions better than is possible in the market. 
Costs of grouping dilemmas can arise as units are added to an organization to 
achieve coordination benefits. Organization members need to be grouped by strategic 
business units, divisions, functional departments, work groups, or teams to harmoniously 
coordinate their actions (Camerer & Knez, 1996). Such groupings facilitate within group 
coordination through common expectations based on trust and convention, but at the 
potential cost of reducing between group coordination (Camerer & Knez, 1996). Group-
level common expectations are a double-edged sword in that, used to facilitate 
coordination within a group, they can diminish coordination between groups. For 
example, common rules and norms developed to govern actions within a group can 
impede coordination and cooperation between groups with different conventions and 
expectations. On the other hand, time taken by members to enhance coordination across 
groups can dilute within group coordination.  
In their efforts to arrive at decisions that are optimal for both parties, firms find it 
difficult to overcome the grouping dilemma (the trade-off between higher coordination 
within, and lower coordination between, groups). The coordination of integrated units 




4.2.5. Critique of the Prior Literature 
As discussed above, the existing literature identified a number of organizational 
costs as well as benefits that accrue to the deployment of these four organizational tools –
- rewards, authority, identification, and coordination –- when a transaction shifts from the 
market to the firm. Despite this importance, several gaps exist in prior studies. First of all, 
few scholars have studied organizational costs relative to organizational benefits. TCE 
scholars have typically both overemphasized change in managers’ opportunistic behavior 
(Williamson, 1975) and assumed that other factors would be held constant. Regarding 
organizational costs as barriers to be overcome, they have simply argued that when 
transaction costs exceed organizational costs, transactions will be governed within firms, 
and when organizational costs exceed transaction costs, transactions will take place in the 
market. But as described above, when a transaction shifts from the market to the firm, 
managerial behavior changes in ways apart from opportunism that generate 
organizational benefits and possibly costs to the firm. Unfortunately, there exists very 
few studies about these other changes in managerial behavior after integration, as Oliver 
Hart and other scholars have indicated (Hart, 2011; Zenger et al., 2011).13
Furthermore, there are few studies based on empirical evidence of such costs. 
Zenger et al.’s (2011) recent theoretical examination of organizational costs like social 
 Scholars have 
only recently begun to examine how post integration changes in managerial behavior can 
yield both benefits and corresponding organizational costs (Zenger et al., 2011) 
                                                 
13 “[There are]… open important questions such as how authority is enforced in an integrated firm, 
what the costs of integration are, and even what integration means (Hart, 2011: p.105)”; “While 
considerable theoretical work focuses on the efficiency and failings of markets and the virtues of hierarchy, 





comparison costs, influence costs, and social attachment costs, for example, is not 
grounded in empirical data. Lack of empirical evidence of organizational costs might be 
attributed to the poorly established concept of organizational costs. Masten et al. (1991) 
argue that both organizational and transaction costs include common costs, as for 
planning, bargaining, contracting, monitoring, and enforcement. The failure of 
distinguishing between organizational and transaction costs poses an obstacle to the 
measurement of the former. Measuring organizational costs as “the number of hours 
devoted by management to planning, directing, and supervising a particular component or 
process times the average hourly management wage rate” (Masten et al., 1991) fails to 
reflect such unique organizational costs as social attachment and influence costs. Thus, 
absent on-site observations, it is difficult to uncover and eventually theorize 
organizational costs not accounted for in previous studies. It may turn out as well that 
some organizational costs are, in fact, not significant. In sum, our understanding of 
organizational costs is limited by lack of empirical evidence.  
Another gap in prior studies of organizational costs is that it is not clear how 
shifting a transaction from market to firm will affect managerial discretion. Transaction 
cost economics posits that integration will forestall opportunistic behavior. But might it 
be always the case that managers’ freedom to pursue personal interests rather than 
organizational value, diminishes after integration? This would likely be the case only if 
incentives can perfectly control for managerial behavior. But, due to imperfect 
performance measures that determine the strength and value of incentive systems, 
incentives (both in the firm and in market exchanges) can distort managerial behavior 




managers’ actions can improve performance measures but not affect organizational value. 
For instance, managers paid an hourly wage may spend most of their time interacting 
with others on Facebook.   
Any examination of whether organizations can deter opportunistic behavior or not 
needs to take into account that Williamson and other TCE scholars, in focusing on 
incentives, have overlooked other aspects of firm boundary decisions like organizational 
tools such as identification and authority. Such other aspects of integration may serve to 
mute the undesirable effect of incentives based on imperfect performance measures. 
Managers who feel an attachment to their organizations, for example, are motivated to 
work hard despite imperfect performance measures and more willing than they would be 
in the market to initiate ideas. Managers, when they feel detached from the organization, 
might be unwilling to contribute to firm productivity. Thus, to the extent to which they 
can carefully design incentives along with these other organizational tools, organizations 
may reduce the distortion effects of imperfect incentives and broaden managerial 
discretion, thereby affording managers a wider and different range of strategic actions 
through which to pursue value creation for their firms. This complementary role of 
organizational tools notwithstanding, whether and how organizations reduce opportunism 
has not been studied. 
To summarize, what such changes in boundary decisions might entail in the way 
of organizational costs and how integration affects managerial behavior appear to be open 
questions. I address this question through a theory-building qualitative study that uses 
qualitative interviews to develop a set of cases that explore organizational costs and 




propose a model that suggests that organizational costs emerge during the integration 
process. Also, I discuss managerial discretion after integration, which is determined as a 
result of the interplay between organizational benefits and costs.  
  
4.3. Study Design 
4.3.1. Research Setting 
The current study aims to build the theory of organizational costs in the context of 
the U.S. hospital industry, which is well suited to my study for the following reason. 
Beginning in the late 1980s and through the mid-1990s, the hospital industry moved 
toward physician-hospital integration in response to the pressure to control admissions 
and costs. Hospitals and physician practice management companies purchased physicians 
groups rapidly and, thus, physicians were employed by hospitals. However, the physician 
practices were sold out again after big failures. Although the market need for low costs 
and convenience is again driving physicians to be employed by the hospitals, the issues 
remain and physicians groups and hospitals must be careful not to make mistakes similar 
to those made in the late 1980s and mid-1990s. Considering that the case in which 
historically autonomous groups of physicians had few or no financial ties with hospitals 
constituted a market transaction, whereas the case in which physicians are employed by 
hospitals (or physician practice management companies) is an instance of firms, the trend 
in the context of the U.S. hospital industry is expected to provide fruitful examples that 




reasons for the failure of physician-hospital integration lacks the systematic analysis I 
would perform in the current study.  
The research design is a multiple-case, inductive study involving two types of 
physician-hospital arrangements: (1) an employed model (i.e., an integrated salary model 
whereby a group of physicians is salaried by a hospital system to provide medical 
services), and (2) a private practice (i.e., a contractual arrangement between physician 
practices and a hospital; a physician or group of physicians who practice medicine 
independently, not as an employee or employees of a hospital). Although there are other 
types of physician-hospital arrangements (e.g., equity model, foundation, and 
management service organization), I chose these two arrangements with an eye to 
examining the distinct effect of physician-hospital integration on physician behavior. 
This research design enables me to investigate how physician behavior varies across 
hospital boundaries and ultimately understand the unique organizational costs imposed by 
integration. 
 
4.3.2. Data Collection 
The qualitative study involved physicians and hospital administrators because 
physicians and administrators may view organizational costs differently even if they are 
in the same organization. I interviewed a total of twenty four persons –- 22 physicians 
and 2 hospital administrators –- over a six-month period (from April to November 2012). 
The interviews were semi-structured, lasted 20 to 60 minutes each, and were recorded. I 




between the case where physicians are in an employed model and the case where they are 
in private practice?” Then I narrowed the interview questions in an effort to find 
systematic patterns across different physician-hospital arrangements and uncover how 
and what organizational costs emerge in the case of physician-hospital integration. 
Because my study aims to reveal unknown as well as known organizational costs 
imposed by integration, or perhaps reveal some expected costs to be insignificant, the 
interviews are designed so as not to be constrained by the costs described in the literature 
review section (see Appendix 4). The interview transcripts that form the basis of my 
analysis filled 245 typed, single-spaced pages.   
 
4.4. Results 
The purpose of this study is to identify key changes in the behavior of individuals 
within the firm in comparison to the market and how these changes generate additional 
organizational costs that would not be present in the corresponding market transaction. 
Through analysis of the data from semi-structured interviews with 22 physicians (11 in 
private practice and 11 in employed model) and 2 hospital administrators, I first outline 
three major changes in physician behavior that occur when physicians move from the 
market (private practice) to the firm (employed model). I then analyze how these 
behavioral changes affect organizational costs and quality of care, and how within-firm 
changes in physician behavior affect physicians’ incentives to pursue personal interests 
rather than organizational value. In this study, I include only quotes that best depict 




incentives. Other quotes that provide similar information but were not included are 
available upon request.  
 
4.4.1. Monitoring 
One of the main things that accounts for differences in physician behavior 
between an employed model and private practice is the introduction of a monitoring 
system. Because a low-powered rewards system, such as guaranteed income and benefits 
in an employed model, is likely to induce less effort and shirking, firms introduce 
monitoring systems for the purpose of collecting information about productivity, and 
grant raises or promotions according to an individual’s contribution to the organization. 
In the context of the U.S. hospital industry, the use of monitoring systems in an employed 
model is the basis for hospitals’ assessments of whether physicians are meeting their 
strategic goals (e.g., quality control, cost efficiency, and safety). For example, hospital 
administrators institute rules and protocols that affect physician behavior (e.g., how many 
surgeries physicians should do, what patients they should see, and who the physicians 
should refer patients to) and develop performance measures to assess physician output. 
Unlike physicians in private practice, who monitor and assess their performance 
themselves, physicians in an employed model are highly affected by hospitals’ 
monitoring systems. An example of physician behavioral changes due to the use of a 





Physician 12: [S]o . . .  I did join the private practice last year for one year and 
now I’m in a hospital employed group. And I think they [private practice and 
employed model] are very different. I think the main points are in the hospital 
employed group there is more administration. There is more structure. There are 
more meetings. There are more standards, checks, and balances about the 
efficiency. There is some loss of autonomy. If you’re by yourself, you answer to 
yourself. You can decide or not decide to do anything. You definitely have more 
people to answer to in an employed structure. 
 
Administrator 2: There are a lot of comparative analyses [in an employed model]. 
They publish monthly and quarterly data performance. . . . There are a lot more 
questions than there will be answers. Why aren’t you up here within the norm, 
and why are you far off? And so they are looking at everything, perfection control, 
numbers, acquisition and perfection, recovery, open hearts. . . when it’s supposed 
to be done, and so there is a lot more data available to systems, and then they are 
sharing that with their C-suite and their chief medical officer. 
 
Physician 5: [W]hen I was in private practice, every two weeks I would have to 
look at the books to make sure that the secretary is paid, the rent was paid. . . . I 
had to make sure there is always money in the pot. I don’t have those concerns 
now. So I don’t even have to look in the books. I just say, okay, let’s get on with 




more time with the hospital meetings than I did in private practice. . . . The 
hospital-based meeting is one hour or one and a half hours, and we have to 
physically be there and discuss everything, and there’s an agenda, and then there 
is an action plan, and then you have to go through it. . . . [S]o those are the 
differences; it is sort of a. . . it is a different menu or a different restaurant. Say 
you come out feeling okay. You had a meal, but you’ve been eating different 
foods. 
 
Because what physicians in private practice make depends highly on how much 
they work, the importance of a strict monitoring system is relatively lower in private 
practice than in an employed model. What those in private practice pay attention to is 
whether they are generating revenue enough to pay their bills and their staff. Otherwise, 
they are unable to feed their family. Thus, those in private practice do not need to be told, 
for instance, whether and when they can take a vacation. Conversely, because physicians 
in an employed model are paid guaranteed income and benefits by the hospitals that 
employ them, the hospitals need to strictly monitor physician productivity and the quality 
of output. Thus, those in an employed model face schedules already made out in advance 
and are expected to be in their hospital as a protocol and are required to attend meetings 
to improve quality and productivity. In sum, lack of latitude due to a monitoring system 
is one of the main behavioral changes occurring when physicians move from private 
practice to an employed model. In the rest of this subsection, I focus on how these 
monitoring-related changes within the firm alter the cost and quality of delivered care, 





Behavioral change due to monitoring systems raises the question of who does the 
task of monitoring. The answer is administrators. However, it is costly to use professional 
administrators to perform various tasks including establishing policies and procedures, 
maintaining computer systems and databases, allocating budgets, tracking accounts and 
finance, etc. Some may argue that there should be a reduction in unit administrative cost 
as the size of a hospital system (e.g., number of physicians) increases. However, 
interviews with physicians (one in private practice and two in the employed model) 
suggest that this is not always the case. As described below, one informant saw, in fact, 
higher administrative costs in an employed model than in private practice.  
 
Physician 18: [W]hen I used to do my own billing [in private practice], I had a 
billing girl. She worked part-time. I think I paid her about $18,000 a year to do 
the billing, and she was very good at collecting money, a good incentive for her. 
But in the hospital they don’t have the incentives to collect so much. Especially 
not collecting for me, and then they charge you, like the hospital where I work is 
charged 6% of the collections, I guess, as the billing fee. Well, if you collect over 
a million dollars a year at 6% that’s a lot; it’s 60,000 per million and it’s like, wait 
a minute, that’s a lot more than I paid a billing girl of my own. . . . I still have the 
same manager actually, but now she manages two practices instead of just one, 




lot higher. I had insurance for my employees, but they have a lot different kinds 
of insurance and it’s more expensive. 
 
Unlike staff members, who perform relatively simple tasks like billing and coding, 
hospital administrators not only manage the staffs that perform such tasks, but also direct 
the overall activities of physicians and hospital departments. But this does not explain 
why the employed model does not always enjoy scale economies, as in the example, in 
billing collection. There could be several reasons that prevent economies of scale. First, 
to make employees motivated, firms need to use motivational approaches to make sure 
that the employees feel rewarded. As described above, hospital systems provide 
expensive benefits that are unavailable to staffs in private practice. Salaries and benefits 
for multiple layers of administration are often too high to realize economies of scale in an 
employed model. Also, as the number of departments that administrators monitor is large 
in size, administrators may lack management time and skill that can be devoted to each 
department. Unlike those who work for only one private practice, administrators in an 
employed model feel de-motivated and uninvolved in the system, leading to overall 
ineffectiveness in monitoring. In sum, monitoring costs are high, as described in the 
example above, and do not have counterparts in private practice.  
 
• Quality 
How does a monitoring system in an employed model affect quality of care? 




with better quality in an employed model than in private practice. Physicians in private 
practice are too busy to attend committee meetings designed to improve quality of care. 
Those in private practice have to manage their time in a way that they can do multiple 
things in a shorter period of time than someone employed by a hospital system may have 
to do. For example, because those in private practice may have to go to different hospitals 
and meet as many patients as possible to pay their bills and their staff, they do not have 
time to keep up with new technology. Academic or hospital employed physicians, on the 
other hand, basically will stay at the same institution and be asked to attend committee 
meetings that provide and hear feedback about how to provide the best care to patients. 
This might lead to differences in quality, as described in the example below.  
 
Physician 12: I think standards, checks, and balances happen less in private 
practice. . . . [which is] less structured. I think one person’s perception of reality is 
very different than when you look at the data in front of you, charting back 
exactly how you encounter patients, how efficient you are, the patients’ 
perspective and their experiences through Q&A, how many complications you 
have with a procedure. These are the things that are not done in small groups 
because they take time, and most people would like to use that time to practice, 
whereas in big groups, [for] a lot of these activities . . . [it is] somewhat mandated 





Physician 19: [I]n the private practice model there is less incentive to, let’s say, 
being up to date. There is no penalty if you don’t know the latest about the 
antibiotics changes or new antibiotics, whereas in a closely monitored employee 
model, and again because of committee work, these issues are addressed 
frequently. And so private doctors vary in their ability to be up to date, and when 
they are very busy it’s questionable whether they have time to sit down and read 
journals, and so I think that’s a concern in the private practice model. 
 
During interviews, as shown above, several doctors suggested that a monitoring 
system that carefully assesses and tracks physician output enables physicians in an 
employed model to provide better service than those in private practice. To further 
support this view, an administrator who is now at one of the largest integrated systems in 
the United States interprets its strict monitoring system as the main reason for winning an 
award for performance excellence given by the President of the United States. 
 
Administrator 1: You are able as a group of physicians to implement things much 
more easily because there is discipline. For instance, we received a “B” award, 
and one of the reasons we got this award is that our physicians are so oriented to 
quality and patient safety. . . .  [I]t just becomes a given and so much more 
disciplined surrounding than you would find among individual physicians, for 






As several physicians (five in private practice and four in the employed model) 
suggested, changes in physician behavior due to hospitals’ monitoring systems are 
expected to decrease physician incentives to work for the hospital, despite the efforts of 
hospital administrators to increase productivity in the system. The main reason behind 
decreased incentives is, as many physicians indicated, lack of good parameters by which 
to judge one’s productivity in the field of medicine. The gap seems to exist between what 
physicians would think of as efficiency or productivity and what administrators believe is 
efficiency or productivity. Management tends to look at tangible metrics, which do not 
necessarily reflect subtle nuances in physician behavior in treating patients. Disagreement 
on high performance and lack of performance measures may lead physicians to feel that 
their work is not rewarded, decreasing physician motivation to work hard. 
 
Physician 18: [T]hey don’t have the right numbers. They are looking at, well, you 
are operating at a loss. . . . They look at revenue minus expenses and say, well 
[jeez], this isn’t working right, we are not making any money on this segment; but 
if they did it right, they would make even more money if they could control the 
way they get the billing. Like, for instance, the smartest thing would be that they 
give me back my old biller [in private practice] and just give me one girl who 
does just my stuff, and not work in a general department where she’s doing more 
than just orthopedics, too, because then they don’t understand all the billing 





Physician 6: When you get to corporate board level, they don’t have intangible 
reporting; they need tangibles, so they need a metric. . . . [S]o what happens is the 
easiest thing to get pushed up in a medical thing is volume of patients and 
purchasing objects, items, okay? It is easy to see, “What did you pay for the 
keyboard, oh, wait, we should go to a different vendor.” What is very challenging 
and impossible for them to report is efficiency, and there’s a variety of reasons for 
it; one, hospitals have bad logistics systems, okay, they don’t run lean and they 
don’t daily report out on efficiency. So you can have great decisions where 
purchasing will say look how much we’ve saved, but it can mess up the efficiency 
of an operation, and that doesn’t show up at the board until two or three business 
quarters later where, let’s say, revenue goes down because case volume is down 
in an operating room. And no one knows why case volume is down. . . . [A]nd so 
then what happens at a board meeting is, boards don’t like silence, so usually 
someone has to fill the void, so someone will say, oh, well, we’re in Michigan, 
you know; it’s the economy, and everyone goes, oh, yeah, it’s the economy. They 
don’t see it. 
 
Given the lack of perfect performance measures, physicians have incentives to act 
only on metrics (Baker, 2002). In other words, physicians in an employed model have 
incentives to work hard only to the extent that they are not penalized. Unlike physicians 
in private practice whose behaviors are easily observed by their partners, those in an 




Physician 22: You probably need to add on some more cases to help the 
department out, to meet the department’s goals and section’s goals and that kind 
of thing, and some people are in tune with that and some people could care less, 
and they just kind of go on and do whatever they want to do because there are no 
detrimental effects of not meeting your goals right now. If you are over and above 
your goals, we get a base salary, and then we get the supplement at the end of the 
year; supposedly we need to have a 3% margin above our goals for the year as a 
department in terms of what we bill or collect. So we’ve got to be 3% above our 
target in order for people to get a bonus, and so there is an incentive to bill more, 
do more, because the more that you bill, you know, if you, individually, if the 
department as a whole meets that 3% margin, then the bonuses that go out 
supposedly are based on your clinical productivity, your research productivity, 
that kind of thing. It has never really been spelled out for us. I don’t really know 
how they come up with the numbers for bonuses. We have only gotten bonuses 
one of the three years I have been here because we have only made our 3% 
margin the first year I was here and the bonus I got was actually quite small. . . . 
This year we would have met, but some of our partners in our group did not fill 
out their billing sheets, and so we missed our bonuses. So nobody gets the bonus 
this year. . . . [M]y one partner and I were talking. . . . “I work my tail off and I 
met my personal goal and it was above that, but yet my bonus was very, very 
small, and so is that bonus even worth it? Do I really care, or could I not work my 





In this case, the physician whose bonus system is structured at a group level rather 
than an individual level often does not have an incentive to work hard for the group. 
Moreover, colleagues’ prevailing free-riding behavior, as in the example above, that is 
not controlled by hospitals’ monitoring systems exacerbates the distortion of physician 
behavior, decreasing physicians’ incentives to make an effort and work to increase their 
hospitals’ performance.   
 
4.4.2. Coordination 
When employed, a group of physicians can no longer remain as an independent 
unit like a private practice. Physicians in an employed model are expected to closely 
work across departments to achieve common objectives. The process of enabling 
different departments to work together by assigning certain roles and responsibilities is 
called coordination. Through this process, a hospital system wants to ensure that 
physicians know exactly whom to report problems to, reducing confusion and possible 
struggles among them. Some may argue that a group of physicians in private practice are 
also assigned certain roles, but the need for coordination is much lower among physicians 
in the same specialty in private practice than among those in different specialties in the 
hospital system. In the rest of this subsection, I focus on how these coordination-related 
changes within the firm (i.e., arranging roles in different departments and combining 
them together in harmonious relation) affect the cost and quality of delivered care and 






The need for coordination and communication across departments often impedes 
the decision making process. Compared to physicians in private practice, in which 
decisions can be made, and consensus reached quickly, among physicians who have 
similar input into how the practice should be run, those in an employed model need to 
discuss with a lot more people who represents different areas before making decisions. 
Commonly highlighted in interviews with four physicians in an employed model are lack 
of speed in decision-making and the ability to adapt.  
 
Physician 18: [W]hen I was chairman of the orthopedic department years ago, I 
would sit at these different committees, and whatever and they would say, well 
you know, . . . they want to make a decision. I’d say, okay, let’s do it, and they’d 
say you should bring it back to your department and then you can discuss it and 
then we’ll meet next month and stuff, and I said no, no, no, my department voted 
me as the chairman so that I can make these decisions for them. So let’s just go 
ahead and do it. But it doesn’t work that way, you know, so they’re not. . . I mean, 
if I want to buy a car, it doesn’t take me very long to make a decision on which a 
car I want and how much I’m willing to spend on it, whereas these people, you 
have to bring it back to that committee . . . and by then you’ll be already looking 
at next year’s model or something, so, kind of crazy. 
Physician 1: Once you are in private practice, it doesn’t take much to set up a 




number of people. It’s a lot easier to put that into action, trying to get a new 
scheduler or a whole lot of issues, retired or resigned or whatever, it’s probably 
easier to maneuver and do something about it. You kind of make your own 
decisions.  
 
Moreover, another coordination costs may arise when an individual department’s 
goals are at odds with the goals of other departments within the organization. Each 
department competes for dollars for investment compared to other departments in the 
hospital, because hospital systems would not just throw away money. Explained one 
physician in the employed model: 
  
Physician 12: [W]e do compete in some way, because if we want a sort of 
technology or investment from the hospital we’re competing for those dollars 
compared to everyone else in the hospital. They’re not going to give it to you just 
to throw away. They need to see it’s worth something, so you do have to answer 
to more people and have to satisfy a bigger group, whether it’s directly competing 
for something specific or in general.  
 
Competition for resources, including money, surgery time, and supplies, will 
cause the departments to undercut each other, leading to conflict between departments or 




described below how intensified rivalry between departments is likely to lead to decisions 
that benefit their own interests rather than the organizations’. Physicians spend 
unnecessarily large amounts of time reporting problems, sometimes falsely reporting 
problems, to get funding from the head of the administration. 
 
Physician 6: Departmentalization cripples you because when you are in a big 
company and you get departmentalized, you start to say things like “I had better 
spend my budget before third quarter is over or else they’ll take it away from me.” 
If the board asks us to do something, I push back and say no, we can do less. If 
they ask anything from me, I ask for more resources; it puts you in a non-
productive mode. 
 
The rivalry between departments impedes efficient resource allocation. It is 
therefore important for hospital systems to correctly examine whether it is worth 
investing before they allocate resources to each department. Otherwise, they can easily 
waste their resources due to rivalry among departments. This coordination cost does not 
exist in private practice, however, because private practice usually works in one area of 
specialty without the need to build boundaries and assign different roles across 
departments. Moreover, the notion that scarce resources need to be protected deters 
unnecessary rivalry among members in private practice and allows them to work for the 






According to the interviews with physicians and one administrator, coordinating 
activities across departments is expected to improve the quality of care generally, despite 
the cost. In most hospital-based systems, the goal is for multiple physicians to work 
together to provide the best quality of care. This is driven by multi-disciplinary 
approaches that involve multiple physicians interacting in meetings, conferences, phone 
calls, and emails to reach consensus about patients’ care and increase awareness of 
surgical options for patients. In comparison to this, physicians in private practice may 
have little or no interaction with anyone in the administration or with people who are in a 
directorship. There is little need for them to talk to physicians in different departments 
about what they want to do or what they are going to do because it does not make any 
difference to them or to the patient. An example of the multi-disciplinary approach is 
described below.  
 
Physician 2: The only way to effectively treat a patient with cancer, really any 
kind of cancer, or specifically the types of cancers that I treat, [which] are 
pancreas, liver, colon, rectum, stomach, the only way to effectively treat a patient 
with any of those cancers is by a multidisciplinary team. So you have to have a 
surgeon, a medical oncologist or medical doctor or radiation type doctor or 
radiation oncologist, a pathologist, a radiologist, gastroenterologist, and multiple 
other members of that team. You have to have all those people. You have to 




not being done, it’s really not the optimal care. . . . So what I do, I talk and discuss 
cases with all those people that I mentioned on a daily basis for every case that 
we’ve seen, and seen together. And then. . . . we all meet. . . . [to] review the case, 
and then we actually see the patient together in my office at a set time after the 
meeting where we’ve discussed the patient. . . . That kind of care, specifically, 
cannot be given, I think, from a private practice perspective.  
 
• Incentives 
Coordination-related changes in physician behavior are expected to decrease 
physician incentives to work for the hospital. In the departmentalized system, physicians 
need to fight for resources of the department they are in. They become incentivized to act 
more to report problems and spend their time filling out reports. Or, doctors who want to 
have all this fancy technology in a given department, though they do not quite know how 
to use it and end up having rooms full of equipment that are not used eventually, are 
eager to get resources for such machines. When physicians think that the resources are 
not effectively distributed according to departments’ circumstances, as in the examples 
below, they feel insulted and lose motivation to work for the system.   
 
Physician 18: [In an employed model…] there are some frustrations that you have 
dealing with a board of trustees and administrators that really don’t know my 
practice at all. They even say “well, if cardiologists do it this way. . . ,” well. . . . I 




two X-ray machines in the office, and they wanted to put in just one, and in the 
emergency room they only have one. [W]ell, they have access to the entire 
department, but in my office I have access to only what X-ray I have. So I need 
two X-rays, especially if there are two or three of us in the office. It took forever 
to have them understand that. . . . Again in private practice, if I have enough 
money to do it I can do it and, or my return on investment is so much and it might 
take a year or two to make that money back on that aspect. But I can’t do that here 
[in the hospital system]. 
 
 Having previously worked in both private practice and an employed model, a 
physician in the example above was able to provide the comparison. As he described, 
physicians in private practice, who do not need to consult with other departments when 
making decisions like ordering MRI machines, can always make decisions and adapt to a 
new environment quickly. Such decisions cannot be made as quickly in an employed 
model due to the need for coordination. The hospital administrators need to look at the 
utilization of existing machines and proceed to order only after it is clear that the new 
machine will benefit the overall system, not just one department. For instance, if 
administrators figure out that the practice of the focal doctor in the interview above is 
only doing two MRIs a month, the right solution should be that they should work out a 
system so that everyone can use the existing MRIs efficiently rather than order more 
MRIs. But those employed doctors whose requests to get something fancy and new get 
rejected would feel personally insulted and become unmotivated at work. This lack of 




 To summarize, the process of assigning roles and responsibilities among 
departments to better achieve the common goals of hospitals might be the basis for the 
best quality of care, but it has its own problem. In addition to that, there are unexpected 




Another difference in physician behavior between an employed model and private 
practice is that physicians are asked to cooperate once they are employed. We can easily 
observe that patients in the hospital system are taken care of by other doctors when the 
focal doctor is out of town and not available. Also, several doctors agreed that as one way 
to associate with other physicians for mutual benefit, physicians in the system are often 
asked to restrict patterns of referrals only to those who have some kind of employment or 
affiliation with the hospital. To support self-referring behavior, many physicians who 
used to be in private practice but now are employed by the hospital system commonly 
indicated that they see referrals from doctors who never used to send them patients when 
they were in private practice, as described below. 
 
Physician 8: As a specialist, you are relying on referrals; you are not the first line 
of doctors to see the patient. If you get sick you go to your primary doctor, and 
then your primary doctor decides whether I should send them to a cardiologist or 




care physicians are a wide variety of employees and non-employees. So if you are 
employed, the hospital tells them. They [hospitals] can’t dictate because that’s 
where there are some violations of that law; it’s called self-referral. So the 
hospitals are very careful not to do that, but in a sense they kind of tell their 
employees to keep it in the family, so to speak. . . . So that becomes a little bit of a 
play for an administration into kind of trying to weave that in, in a very legally 
acceptable way, where they could affect patterns of referrals only to those who 
have some kind of employment with the hospital or affiliation with the hospital. 
So that’s the kind of message that I would call the unwritten message. 
Physician 18: They [administrators] presented one case where they can track a lot 
of the money that you would generate. One guy generated nothing and the other 
guy generated, say, a million dollars in his referrals. So they looked at the leakage 
and said, well, Geez! We could have made this extra had this doctor referred his 
patients to us instead of out there, so they want to keep the things in house.  
 
Physician 14: You can see a change in referral patterns. Physicians that may have 
referred to you before are suddenly no longer referring to you because they are 
now part of the hospital system. They are now employed physicians, so they are 
bound by those restrictions to refer only to certain people. You can see some of 
those changes happening.  
 
Physician 4: Most often private practice physicians or surgeons. . . . they not only 




institutions, and so they don’t have the royalty so to speak. . . . but I believe when 
they’re part of Y hospital system, they’re willing to help us whenever we need 
them, so I think shared identity does help our system. 
 
As described in the several examples above, when physicians become employees 
of a hospital system they are required to help each other within the system. This behavior 
is not found in private practice. Those in private practice, of course, will help each other, 
but they are less likely to share patients because the patients who want to see a private 
practice doctor generally prefer strong attachment to a particular doctor. Also, physicians 
in private practice, who need to build good reputation and maintain their referral bases, 
do not restrict referring doctors to a certain system.  
Next, I examine how these cooperation-related behavioral changes within the firm, 




• Costs  
As mentioned earlier, unlike employed physicians, who get fixed income and 
benefits, physicians in private practice make as much as they work. But at the same time, 
they face downside risks (e.g., income fluctuating according to economic conditions). 
The first concern of private practice doctors, when referring patients, is not to lose their 




Thus, to these physicians in private practice, cooperative behavior among hospital-
affiliated doctors is seen as something that threatens their practice.  
 
Physician 5: If it [self-referral] is a recurring pattern, they [primary physicians] 
really would then say, “you know, you [patient] go to somebody else for your 
cardiac surgery; don’t go to doctor A and his group because the patients don’t 
come back to us and because the patient is a source of revenue for them, too, and 
not only from an economic point of view, but they have relationships with them 
and the good primary care physicians and family practice folks have treated the 
patient, their family, and their family’s families.” I mean that’s how it is, 
especially in the more stable communities. . . . That would be probably the last 
time doctor A gets a case from him [the primary doctor]. 
 
As revealed not only in the example above, but also in interviews with several 
physicians (three in private practice and two in the employed model), cooperation among 
physicians within a hospital system, particularly excessive self-referral, comes with costs. 
Primary doctors who are not affiliated with the hospital system eventually stop sending 
their patients to the circle of the hospital system when they see that the patients they refer 
to doctors within the system do not come back. This will eventually limit the growth of 
patients in the future. These costs do not have counterparts in the market transaction 
(private practice), because, as mentioned in the previous section, physicians in private 






Through cooperation, a hospital system may enable patients to be taken care of by 
doctors even when the focal doctor is not available. But that is not enough. Patients who 
want to see the same doctor often cannot because the physicians work shifts and are not 
on call every night. In order to see the same focal doctor, physicians need to put in extra 
work, which the hospitals’ systems do not require, and also do not need to require 
because there are other physicians who can take care of these patients. Given the 
importance of a tight physician-patient relationship, patients who want to, but cannot, be 
seen by the same doctor end up dissatisfied.  
 
Physician 19: I know from my own family. . . .  [what] they don’t like; in the 
hospitals’ model they get . . . different hospitalists every two, three days. And 
they don’t have the sense of continuity and “who’s my doctor.” . . . [S]o some of 
the patients’ satisfaction with that [employed] model is not very high. 
 
Several physicians (two in private practice and two in the employed model) 
remarked that weak attachment to patients will likely to lead to decreased patient 
satisfaction. Supporting this, one will typically find that a large proportion of highly 
ranked doctors in community magazines or newspapers are in private practice rather than 
in an employed model.  
 
Physician 14: [H]ospitals are big business, multi millions of dollars going on, and 




orthopedic surgeons in this town who can do an excellent knee replacement. So 
all things being equal, the family physician who oversees that patient is going to 
send them to someone within their referral hospital group as opposed to sending 
them to me [a physician in private practice]. If there is a surgeon outside the 
hospital group that does a “better job” at a particular procedure, but the other 
surgeon within the group still performs it, I can tell you that the surgeon within 
the group will be referred the case. 
 
Self-referral, another cooperation-related behavior change, is also expected to hurt 
the overall quality of delivered care, as shown in the foregoing example of a physician in 
private practice. Problems arise when physicians in an employed model send their 
patients not because referred physicians are good, but because they are within the circle 
of the hospital system. These self-referrals may benefit the financial health of the hospital 




In private practice, physicians have to be available and see patients on time. If 
they fail to do this, there are no other physicians to take their place. A small number of 
other physicians are busy treating their own patients. Thus, physicians who are not 
available hurt their reputations and lose their referral base. But physicians in an employed 
model, who take shifts with other doctors, do not need to put in extra effort. When the 




but decreased continuity in patient care. As shown in the previous quality section, 
patients in large hospital systems may be seen by a doctor quickly, but feel detached from 
their doctor. As a result of being part of a hospital system, physicians do not put in extra 
effort and physician incentives to pursue the interests of the hospital system decrease. 
Explained one physician in private practice:    
 
Physician 9: [I]n private practice your referral base is directly tied to your 
outcomes and how well you treat your patients and your referring doctors. And so 
I think in private practice you are much less likely to turn down a patient or a 
consult because you want the patients and their referring doctors to know that you 
are always available. Because if you are not, they may seek to send their patients 
somewhere else. And you are also probably less likely to take as much vacation 
time for the same reason. Whereas I think if you are employed by the hospital, 
you just kind of say, “Well from the marketing standpoint, all that, that’s their job. 
When I’m off, I’m off; when I’m working, I’m working, and I let them take care 
of all the business aspects of the practice.” 
 
4.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In previous studies, aspects apart from changes in opportunistic behavior are 
assumed to be held constant when a transaction shifts from the market to the firm. 
Transaction cost economics offers little, if any, explanation of what such changes in 




such explanations that I undertook the qualitative study of physician-hospital 
arrangements. The interviews with physicians and hospital administrators in two different 
types of physician-hospital arrangements highlighted three evident organizational costs: 
monitoring costs, coordination costs, and cooperation costs.  Also, the qualitative 
interviews reveal that unlike the previous literature, which posits that managerial freedom 
to pursue personal goals rather than organizational value decreases after integration, 
changes in behavior in fact work together to increase managerial freedom. In other words, 
managers’ incentives to work for the organization decrease. By empirically examining 
variation both within and outside firms, the present study enhances understanding of the 
determinants of managerial discretion. 
This study has some limitations. My study considers only two simplified 
physician-hospital arrangements. In the hospital industry, there exist various types of 
physician-hospital arrangements, such as independent practice associations, open 
physician hospital organizations, closed physician organizations, management service 
organizations, foundation models, and integrated salary models. My study chose two 
extreme versions of integration: independent practice associations (private practice), and 
the integrated salary model (an employed model).14
                                                 
14  According to a continuum based on the degree of integration between a hospital and its 
physician groups, independent practice associations are the least integrated case and the integrated salary 
model is a fully-integrated case (Cuellar & Gertler, 2006). 
 As a future direction, it would be 
worthwhile to explore middle ground physician-hospital arrangements between these two 
extremes in order to identify how organizational costs vary across different levels of 
vertical integration. Future research could also examine changes in physician-hospital 




is, a change from private practice to the employed model), and how these changes alter 
physician behavior. In the current study, I compare physician behavior between two 
arrangements during a snapshot of a time. Examining how physicians gradually change 
their behavior during periods of changes in arrangements could capture the appearance 
and disappearance of both market and organizational costs. Despite these limitations, I 
believe that providing a detailed look at how physician behavior differs between two 
extremes, and identifying what organizational costs arise in the integrated model, will 








The broad objective of this dissertation is to investigate how different 
organizational forms – the formal structures by which firms coordinate and control the 
behavior of their members – affect managerial discretion. In chapter 3, I study how 
managerial discretion is affected by ownership type (for-profit, government, and not-for-
profit), highlighting the different levels of organizational constraints that exist in each 
type. In chapter 4, I examine how managerial discretion varies following the 
internalization of transactions from the market, identifying specifically the organizational 
costs incurred when transactions are governed within the firm. 
The core theoretical contribution of the dissertation is the examination of how 
managerial discretion is determined by firm-level factors, namely, ownership type and 
vertical integration, which have not been studied previously in comparison to industry 
and individual-level factors. In doing so, it contributes to the theories of ownership type 
and the firm. 
First, in a departure from much of the ownership literature that focuses on the 
lever of incentive alignment, my dissertation considers organizational constraints as an 




on variation in the stock dispersion of for-profit organizations and incentive alignment 
mechanisms posited that ownership type itself does not affect managerial behavior due to 
the endogeniety between ownership type and incentives. What I argue is that there are 
other ways of classifying ownership type, and that when we start considering another 
lever that guides managerial behavior, organizational constraints, it becomes apparent 
that the effect of ownership is not completely offset by incentives.  
Methodologically, my dissertation adds to recent discussions by several authors of 
the effect of ownership type and managerial behavior. What Demsetz and his colleagues 
criticized is that scholars had simply regressed ownership type on managerial behavior 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Vilalonga, 2001). Demsetz and his colleagues, 
however, believed that the relationship between ownership and managerial behavior 
would disappear when they introduce a good instrument, because ownership type and 
incentives are simultaneously chosen. But the problem still exists that the strength of the 
results is only as good as the instruments, and instruments like firm size, firm specific 
risk, and debt ratio, are not truly exogenous. As a result, in previous literature, the 
relationship disappears with some instruments and still exists with other instruments (Cho, 
1998; Davies, Hillier, & McColgan, 2005; Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999). What I 
contribute to the existing literature is to suggest that the instrumental approach is not the 
best way to see the effect of ownership. Instead, I look at an exogenous shock that affects 
behavior without affecting ownership type or incentive systems. This enables me to trace 
the relationship between ex ante differences in ownership type and changes in managerial 
behavior in response to the shock. One such shock is the threat of malpractice liability in 




Finally, my dissertation complements existing theories of the firm. Transaction 
cost economists have focused more on decreases in opportunism after integration, but 
less on organizational costs as opposed to market costs. Lack of attention to 
organizational costs post integration is problematic in deciding between the choice of 
firm or market, because failure to correctly compare organizational costs and market 
costs may lead to wrong decisions. By carefully examining the organizational costs 
imposed by integration decisions, my dissertation addresses concerns about lack of 
research on organizational failure and the costs of integration, to which Oliver Hart and 
other scholars (Hart, 2011; Zenger et al., 2011) have called attention.  
The dissertation opens up several opportunities for future research. First, I chose a 
particular way of classifying ownership type – as for-profit, not-for-profit, and 
government – and studied the impact of three types of ownership on managerial 
discretion. In order to further validate the importance of the lever of organizational 
constraints, future work is warranted to test how other types of ownership (e.g., 
family/institutional/state or religious/non-religious) affect managerial behavior.  
Second, the question of when and how firms may reduce organizational costs 
cannot be addressed by the present study. In the current study, I found integration as a 
means of adjusting managerial discretion to invariably increase costs. However, I argue 
that integration may also provide several benefits that may offset these costs. For instance, 
shared identity (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005) between employees and the firm will compel 
employees to actively work towards organizational goals (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005), and 
help them coordinate actions in a timely manner with a reduced level of information 




conditions such as employee stock ownership and employee participation on the board 
foster organizational identification (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2001) and thus induce 
managerial effort, thereby helping firms offset organizational costs.  
Finally, my dissertation investigates post integration organizational costs using 
semi-structured interviews in the hospital industry. Future work relying on 
complementary secondary data or survey methods to describe organizational costs in 
detail would increase the credibility and validity of the results. 
In conclusion, my dissertation seeks to contribute to the literatures on ownership 
type, the firm, and managerial discretion. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, 
I extend the theory of ownership by showing that ownership matters the after accounting 
for endogeniety between ownership type and incentives, and suggesting a new 
perspective on organizational costs that are incurred following integration. I hope my 




TABLE 1.  
 
 Concentrated Ownership Dispersed Ownership 
Costs of Risk Bearing High Low 








 This is a study of how different ownership structures affect physician behavior. 
The specific interview guide is as follows. Notice that the interview guide is customized 






1. First, can you tell me about yourself? How long have you been working in 
this hospital? 
 
• Experience in hospitals 
• Title & Specialty 
• How you came to the job that you’re doing now 
• Whether you are employed (hospital-based) or not  
 
2. Let’s talk about other sources that might affect your practice in treating your 
patients above and beyond symptoms of patients.  
 
• Performance Feedback: Is there any specific periodic performance 
feedback from hospital administration office?  
• Peer pressure: Do administrators come and compare you with other 
physicians to encourage you to improve your practice or to reduce the 
costs of treating patients? Or, is there any implicit peer pressure that you 
might think of? 
• Bureaucracy: Let’s say you want to have several CT scans or MRIs to 
make a more accurate diagnosis. Or, let’s say you want to do surgery to 
your patients? What are the administrative processes that you undergo? 
For instance, do you need to get confirmed by the administration office of 
your hospital before you do those tests or surgery? Or, do you hear any 
feedback regarding the costs of those tests or the performance of those 
surgeries from administration office afterwards? 
• Financial constraint: Have any administrators or physician leader spoken 
about financial constraints of hospitals to you, e.g., Medicare cutback, 




• Board: Do you think that the governing board has an effect on your 
practice? How often do you see or hear from those board members? Are 
there any physicians who are on the governing board?  








1. Have you ever worked in the hospitals with different ownership structure?  
 
a) Yes 
• What was the ownership structure of the hospital at which you’ve worked 
before? 
• Do you think that your practice has changed since you moved to the 
current hospital?  
• What are the changes? 
• Why do you think that you’ve changed your practices?  
• Do you think the level of discretion has changed since you moved to the 
current hospital?  
• Could you compare and contrast two (or more) different ownership 
structures? 
 
 b) No 
• Do you think that physician practices differ across different hospital 
ownership structures?  
• Do you expect that your practices will change if you move to hospitals 
with a different ownership structure?  




1. Do you have administrative, teaching, research or other professional 
obligations in the hospital? 
• How is your contribution valued?  
• Does the number of patients affect your salary? Or will the number of 
hours you worked be adjusted?  
• Is there any adjustment for teaching or research? 
 
2. You already explained the difference among different hospital ownership 
structures. Would your contribution to the hospital be valued differently if 
you were working in one with a different ownership structure?   
• Do you think your salary will be different if you move to other hospitals? 






1. Have you heard of any large malpractice lawsuits that have happened in 
your hospital or any other hospitals near you? 
 
a) Yes, in other hospitals but not in our hospitals 
• Where and when did such lawsuits happen? 
• Do you know how the hospitals reacted to those lawsuits?  
 
Let’s assume that malpractice lawsuits happen to your hospital.  
• How do you think that your hospital would react?  
• What are the circumstances that you can think of?  
• Do you think that there will be some circulars passing around within the 
hospitals? 
 If so, what would be in that circular?  
• With whom should the physician share this problem?  
• Is there any risk management department where you can talk to lawyers? 
 
  b) Yes, only in our hospital but not in other hospitals 
• How did you know?  
• Were there any circulars passed around? 
 What did you think when you saw those circulars? 
• Did you hear from other colleagues?   
• Were there any announcements?  
• Did you read about these in local newspapers? 
• How did your hospital react to those lawsuits?  
• Did your hospital take any action to revise expectations about the litigious 
environment and make you become more cautious?  
• Did you get help from the risk management department of your hospital (if 
any)? 
• Do you think that your hospital reacted to those lawsuits in an efficient 




State State Poverty Rate 01' County County Poverty Rate 01' Hospital Name Ownership Types
MS 19.0% Marshall County 19.0% ALLIANCE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM for-profit 
MS 19.0% Grenada County 19.1% GRENADA LAKE MEDICAL CENTER government
MS 19.0% Lowndes County 19.1% BAPTIST MEM HOSPT-GOLDEN TRIANGLE not-for-profit
MS 19.0% Lauderdale County 18.7% RUSH FOUNDATION HOSPITAL not-for-profit
MS 19.0% Lauderdale County 18.7% RILEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL for-profit 
MS 19.0% Lauderdale County 18.7% JEFF ANDERSON HOSPITAL not-for-profit
MS 19.0% Lauderdale County 18.7% THE SPECIALTY HOSPITAL OF MERIDIAN not-for-profit
MS 19.0% Jones County 18.8% SOUTH CENTRAL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTR government
LA 18.3% Webster Parish 18.2% SPRINGHILL MEDICAL CENTER for-profit 
LA 18.3% Webster Parish 18.2% MINDEN MEDICAL CENTER for-profit 
LA 18.3% Pointe Coupee Parish 18.1% POINTE COUPEE GENERAL HOSPITAL government
LA 18.3% Union Parish 18.1% TRI WARD GENERAL HOSPITAL government
LA 18.3% Union Parish 18.1% UNION GENERAL HOSPITAL  INC. not-for-profit
LA 18.3% Assumption Parish 18.7% OUR LADY OF THE LK ASSUMP. COMM HOS not-for-profit
LA 18.3% Jefferson Davis Parish 17.7% OCHSNER CLINIC FOUNDATION not-for-profit
OH 10.3% Morrow County 10.3% MORROW COUNTY HOSPITAL government
OH 10.3% Montgomery County 10.4% FRANCISCAN MEDICAL CENTER - DAYTON not-for-profit
OH 10.3% Montgomery County 10.4% MIAMI VALLEY HOSPITAL not-for-profit
OH 10.3% Montgomery County 10.4% GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL not-for-profit
OH 10.3% Montgomery County 10.4% KETTERING MEMORIAL HOSPITAL not-for-profit
OH 10.3% Montgomery County 10.4% DAYTON HEART HOSPITAL for-profit 
OH 10.3% Montgomery County 10.4% LIFECARE HOSPITALS OF DAYTON for-profit 
OH 10.3% Montgomery County 10.4% TWIN VALLEY BHO-DAYTON CAMPUS government
MI 9.8% Delta County 9.9% ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL not-for-profit
MI 9.8% Kalamazoo County 10.0% BRONSON METHODIST HOSPITAL not-for-profit
MI 9.8% Kalamazoo County 10.0% BORGESS MEDICAL CENTER not-for-profit
MI 9.8% Kalamazoo County 10.0% BRONSON VICKSBURG HOSPITAL not-for-profit
MI 9.8% Kalamazoo County 10.0% SSH - KALAMAZOO for-profit 
MI 9.8% Kalamazoo County 10.0% KALAMAZOO PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL government
MI 9.8% Presque Isle County 10.4% ROGERS CITY REHABILITATION HOSPITAL for-profit 
MI 9.8% Tuscola County 9.1% CARO CENTER government
CT 7.1% New London County 6.3% LAWRENCE & MEMORIAL HOSPITAL not-for-profit
CT 7.1% New London County 6.3% THE WILLIAM W. BACKUS HOSPITAL not-for-profit
CT 7.1% Windham County 7.9% DAY KIMBALL HOSPITAL not-for-profit
CT 7.1% Windham County 7.9% WINDHAM COMMUNITY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL not-for-profit
CT 7.1% Fairfield County 6.2% SOUTHWEST CT MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM government
CT 7.1% Hartford County 8.0% JOHN DEMPSEY HOSPITAL government
CT 7.1% Litchfield County 5.0% SHARON HOSPITAL for-profit
NH 6.0% Merrimack County 6.2% CONCORD HOSPITAL  INC. not-for-profit
NH 6.0% Merrimack County 6.2% NEW LONDON HOSPITAL not-for-profit
NH 6.0% Merrimack County 6.2% FRANKLIN REGIONAL HOSPITAL not-for-profit
NH 6.0% Merrimack County 6.2% HEALTHSOUTH REHAB HOSPITAL OF CONCOR for-profit
NH 6.0% Merrimack County 6.2% NEW HAMPSHIRE HOSPITAL government
NH 6.0% Hillsborough County 5.5% MONADNOCK COMMUNITY HOSPITAL not-for-profit
NH 6.0% Hillsborough County 5.5% CBHS OF BROOKSIDE / NEW ENGLAND  LLC for-profit
NH 6.0% Rockingham County 4.2% NORTHEAST REHABILITATION HOSPITAL government



















Employee’s incomplete information set and 
tendency to exaggerate their contribution to the 
organization can make them feel they are 
unfairly rewarded for their efforts. This can 
cause them to put less effort or exit from the 




Authority Inefficiencies in 
communication 
This paper examines the allocation of formal 
authority and real authority. They emphasize the 
trade-off between loss of control and initiative. 
This implies that centralization (non-delegation 
of formal authority) will jeopardize 




Authority Inefficiencies in 
communication 
This paper provides scope conditions of Aghion 
and Tirole (1997)'s argument. Centralization 
(hierarchical firms) only hurts agent's initiatives 
in case of soft information (i.e., information that 
cannot be credibly transmitted to others). When 
information is hardened and thus can be verified 
by others relatively easily, hierarchies perform 
better.   
Milgrom 
(1988)  
Authority Influence Costs Firm productivity can decline if subordinates 
spend too much to influence the decisions made 
by the central authority. Organization should be 
designed carefully to draw individuals' attention 
from redistributive activities to socially 





Authority Influence Costs In the presence of information asymmetries, the 
agents who have an information advantage 
attempt to manipulate the information they 
develop and provide with the purpose of 













Monetary compensation, often based on 
imperfect indicator of individual effort, is 
incomplete. Identity, which aligns the goals of 
employees with those of the firm, can be 
supplement to monetary compensation. To 
motivate employees through identity, firms need 
to invest in motivational capital, such as firm-











Enhanced level of social relations within a firm 
may hurt firm efficiency. Overembeddedness 
leads to (1) failure to switch to new relations 





Coordination Costs of 
grouping 
dilemmas  
Grouping can facilitate coordination and 
cooperation within a group through direct 
supervision and mutual adjustment. However, 
grouping can also inhibit coordination and 
cooperation among different groups. This is 
called grouping dilemma, which determines the 





Appendix 4. Interview Guideline (2)  
A. Physicians 
 
This is a study of how different physician-hospital integration affects physician behavior. 
The specific interview guide is as follows.  
 
First, can you tell me about yourself? Please summarize your personal and 
professional background.  
 
• Experience in hospitals 
• Title & Specialty 
• How you came to the job that you’re doing now 
• Whether you are employed (hospital-based) or not  
 
 
Let’s talk about other sources that might affect your practice in treating your 




1. Do you have administrative, teaching, research or other professional 
obligations in the hospital? 
• How is your contribution valued? Who collects the information? How do they 
collect information?  
• Does the number of patients affect your salary? Or will the number of hours 
you worked be adjusted? Is there any adjustment for teaching or research? 
 
2. Would your contribution to the hospital be valued differently if you were 
working in one with a different physician-hospital arraignment (integration 
vs. contractual arrangement)?   
• Do you think your salary will be different if you move to other hospitals? Do 
you think any obligations that you have now will change if you move? 
 
3.  How do you think about your reward system?  
• How effectively is individual contribution or performance valued? Have you 
seen any free-riding? Or unfair cases? (e.g., missing bonuses because of others 
mistakes) 








1. Who gives instruction in how to perform your work?  
• How do you communicate with your hospital administration office or 
section/division heads?  
• How often do you hear feedback or orders from the administration office or 
section/division heads? What are the things they ask you to do? Do they 
encourage you to improve your practice or to reduce the costs of treating 
patients?  
• Would your opinion be well received by them? What efforts do they make, if 
any, to collect information on physicians’ needs or concerns? 
 
2.  Would the instruction/communication be different if you are/are not an 
employee of the hospital? 
• How do you (and other physicians) change your practice to impress the 
administration office or section/division heads? What kinds of activities does 





1. Has membership in this hospital changed you as a physician?  
• In what way? Through what processes or experiences? How do you evaluate 
this change?  
• How would you describe yourself when you first entered this hospital? How 
would you describe yourself now? Can you illustrate any characteristics at 
each point with an example?  
 
2. Tell me about the hospital’s socialization processes.  
• What kinds of processes does the hospital have in place to instill a shared 
identity, or a sense of “we”? 
• Do hospitals sponsor events intended to enhance trust and build identity? Any 
group lunches, sporting activities, or other company gatherings?  
• How effective are these processes?  
 
3.  How successful/unsuccessful do you consider your hospital? Why? Against 
which standard do you assess its relative success?  
• Can you list key elements of your hospital’s success? How would you 





1. How do you describe coordination with other departments?  
• Can you illustrate this coordination with an example? (e.g., sharing CT scans 




• How often do you interact with other departments or sections? How does this 
interaction affect your practice in treating patients?  
• How successful do you consider this coordination? How would you improve 
this?  
 
2. How would this interaction with other departments or sections be different if 
you were/were not an employee of the hospital? 
Physician-hospital Integration 
 
Have you ever worked in the hospitals with a different arrangement?  
 
a) Yes 
• What was the physician-hospital arrangement (integration vs. contractual 
 arrangement) at which you worked before? 
• Do you think that your practice has changed since you moved to the current   
hospital?  
• What are the changes? 
• Do you think the level of discretion has changed since you moved to the current 
hospital? Are there a new set of actions that were not available to you but are now 
available? Are there any restrictions on the set of actions that were previously 
available to you, but not available in the current hospital? 
 
b)  No 
• How do you think that physician practices differ across different physician-
hospital arrangements?  
• How do you expect that your practices will change if you move to hospitals with a 
different physician-hospital arrangement?  




















B. Hospital Administrators  
 
This is a study of how different physician-hospital integration affects physician behavior. 
The specific interview guide is as follows.  
 
 
First, can you tell me about yourself? Please summarize your personal and 
professional background.  
 
• Experience in hospitals 
• Title & Specialty 
• How you came to the job that you’re doing now 
• Whether you are employed (hospital-based) or not  
 
 
Let’s talk about other sources that you think affect your physicians' practice in 




1. Do physicians have administrative, teaching, research or other professional 
obligations in the hospital? 
• How is their contribution valued? Who collects the information? How do you 
collect information?  
• Does the number of patients affect their salary? Or will the number of hours 
they worked be adjusted? Is there any adjustment for teaching or research? 
 
2. Do you think that the way that physicians’ contribution to the hospital is 
valued would be different across different physician-hospital arraignment 
(i.e., physicians are employed or have independent contractual arrangement)?   
• Do you think physician salary will be different if they move to other hospitals? 
Do you think any obligations that physicians have now will change if they 
move? 
 
3.  How do you think about physician reward system?  
• How effectively is individual contribution or performance valued? Have you 
seen any free-riding? Or unfair cases? (e.g., missing bonuses because of others 
mistakes) 





1. Who gives instruction to physicians?  
• How do physicians communicate with you, other administrators or 




• How often do you give feedback or orders to physicians? What are the things 
you ask them to do? Do you encourage them to improve their practice or to 
reduce the costs of treating patients?  
• How often do you hear their opinion? How do you collect information on 
physicians’ needs or concerns? 
 
2.  Would the instruction/communication be different if physicians are/are not 
an employee of the hospital? 





1. Do you think physician employment in this hospital change them as a 
physician?  
• In what way? Through what processes or experiences? How do you evaluate 
this change?  
• How would you describe them when they first entered this hospital? How 
would you describe them now? Can you illustrate any characteristics at each 
point with an example?  
 
2. Tell me about the hospital’s socialization processes.  
• What kinds of processes do you implement to instill a shared identity, or a 
sense of “we”?  
• Do hospitals sponsor events intended to enhance trust and build identity? Any 
group lunches, sporting activities, or other company gatherings? If so, who are 
invited? Are physicians in the independent physician practice also invited?  
• How effective are these processes?  
 
3.  How successful/unsuccessful do you consider your hospital? Why? Against 
which standard do you assess its relative success?  
• Can you list key elements of your hospital’s success? How would you 





1. How do you describe coordination with other departments?  
• Can you illustrate this coordination with an example? (e.g., sharing CT scans 
or getting advice from other departments when making a diagnosis) 
• How often do physicians interact with other departments or sections? How 
does this interaction affect their practice in treating patients?  






2. How would this interaction with other departments or sections be different if 




Have you ever worked in the hospitals with a different arrangement?  
 
a) Yes 
• What was the physician-hospital arrangement (integration vs. contractual 
 arrangement) at which you worked before? 
• Do you think that physician practice has changed since you moved to the current   
hospital?  
• What are the changes? 
• Do you think the level of physician discretion is different? Are there a new set of 
actions that were not available to physicians but are now available? Are there any 
restrictions on the set of actions that were previously available to physicians, but 
not available in the current hospital?  
 
b)  No 
• How do you think that physician practices differ across different physician-
hospital arrangements?  
• How do you expect that physician practices will change if you move to hospitals 
with a different physician-hospital arrangement?  





















Subject Hospital-physician Arrangement Specialty Gender Location
1 Administrator 1 Hospital Administrator n/a Male Detroit, MI
2 Physician 1 Employed model Surgery Male Detroit, MI
3 Physician 2 Employed model Surgery Male Detroit, MI
4 Physician 3 Employed model Surgery Male Detroit, MI
5 Physician 4 Private Practice Surgery Female Detroit, MI
6 Physician 5 Employed model Surgery Male Detroit, MI
7 Physician 6 Private Practice Surgery Male Detroit, MI
8 Physician 7 Employed model Surgery Male Saginaw, MI
9 Physician 8 Employed model Surgery Male Saginaw, MI
10 Physician 9 Private Practice Surgery Male Saginaw, MI
11 Physician 10 Private Practice Surgery Male Saginaw, MI
12 Physician 11 Private Practice Surgery Male Detroit, MI
13 Physician 12 Employed model Surgery Male Ann Arbor, MI
14 Physician 13 Private Practice Surgery Female Saginaw, MI
15 Physician 14 Private Practice Surgery Male Saginaw, MI
16 Physician 15 Employed model Surgery Male Saginaw, MI
17 Physician 16 Private Practice Surgery Male Detroit, MI
18 Physician 17 Private Practice Internal Medicine Female Ann Arbor, MI
19 Administrator 2 Hospital Administrator n/a Male Saginaw, MI
20 Physician 18 Employed model Surgery Male Saginaw, MI
21 Physician 19 Employed model Surgery Female Saginaw, MI
22 Physician 20 Private Practice Surgery Male Columbus, OH
22 Physician 21 Private Practice Surgery Male Saginaw, MI















3 responses                     
(1 in priviate practice    
2 in employed model 
0 administrators)
6 responses                     
(1 in priviate practice    
5 in employed model 
0 administrators)
6 responses                     
(3 in priviate practice    
3 in employed model 
0 administrators)
Quality
6 responses                     
(0 in priviate practice    
4 in employed model 
2 administrators)
4 responses                     
(0 in priviate practice    
3 in employed model 
1 administrators)
5 responses                     
(3 in priviate practice    
2 in employed model 
0 administrators)
Incentives
9 responses                     
(5 in priviate practice    
4 in employed model 
0 administrators)
3 responses                     
(1 in priviate practice    
2 in employed model 
0 administrators)
1 responses                     
(1 in priviate practice    
0 in employed model 
0 administrators)
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